Publication
Omar Shaban Ismail · Middle East Institute · 2016
A 2016 Middle East Institute analysis of Egyptian-Hamas relations under el-Sisi. Shaban examines the uneasy but functional limited cooperation — Rafah as the central bargaining chip, Egyptian intelligence back-channels, Qatar financial transfers via Cairo — and the constraints preventing deeper formal engagement: the Brotherhood terrorist designation, Egyptian public opinion, and Palestinian Authority resistance.
A 2016 Middle East Institute analysis of Egyptian-Hamas relations under el-Sisi. Shaban examines the uneasy but functional limited cooperation — Rafah as…
By 2016, the relationship between Egypt under President el-Sisi and Hamas had stabilized into an uneasy but functional pattern of limited cooperation — a relationship shaped primarily by Egyptian security imperatives rather than political sympathy. Cairo's primary concern was the Sinai insurgency and its alleged connections to Hamas's military wing; the question of whether Egypt and Hamas were moving toward cooperation therefore depended heavily on how those security dynamics evolved.
The Rafah crossing — Gaza's only border point not controlled by Israel — was the central bargaining chip. Egypt had kept Rafah largely closed since 2013, citing security concerns after the Sinai attacks. The economic pressure this created for Gaza's two million residents was severe and provided Egypt with significant leverage over Hamas. Limited cooperation — partial opening of Rafah, medical evacuations, construction material entry — was Egypt's primary tool for moderating Hamas behavior without formally engaging with its political agenda.
The 2016 period saw incremental movement: Egyptian intelligence maintained back-channels with Hamas, occasional Rafah opening allowed limited civilian movement, and Qatar continued providing financial transfers to Hamas via Cairo. But structural cooperation — a formal Egypt-Hamas agreement on security coordination, permanent Rafah opening, or Egyptian mediation of Gaza-Fatah reconciliation — remained elusive.
The constraints on deeper cooperation were real. El-Sisi's government had designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, and Hamas — a Brotherhood offshoot — could not be embraced publicly. Egyptian public opinion, shaped by the post-2013 narrative, was hostile to Islamist movements. And the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, Egypt's preferred Palestinian interlocutor, resisted any arrangement that enhanced Hamas's standing.
Topic: Regional & International Politics — Egypt · Hamas · mediation · Sinai — Text © Middle East Institute — archived here with attribution to the source. — Original source