Publication
Omar Shaban Ismail · Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung · 2017
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung PAL PAPER (Dec 2017) on Saudi political restructuring under MbS and implications for the Palestinian cause; PDF hosted via PalThink.
First: the crisis developments
The region is living in a state of suspension and
anticipation due to the steady, political changes and
developments Saudi Arabia has undergone since King
Salman assumed the throne. There is an attempt to
rebuild the political system in the kingdom to ensure
the establishment of the Emir and the rising crown
Prince, Mohammed bin Salman’s role. Besides, the
regime has made huge and successive changes; all of
them are mostly directed towards the focus of
security, economic, and religious power in the hands
of the newly appointed crown prince.
At both political and security levels, Prince
Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Defense
Minister as soon as his father took over.
Subsequently, the former Crown Prince, Prince
Mohammed bin Nayef, was removed from the
Covenant and from the leadership of the Interior
Ministry. Finally, Prince Mutaib bin Abdul Aziz was
dismissed from the presidency of the National Guard
since he was a possible rival of Mohammed bin
Salman on the crown prince, who thus dominated the
leadership of the main security institutions in the
kingdom: the army, the National Guard, and the
Interior, without rivaling influential princess from the
ruling family.
On the economic front, Prince Mohammed bin Salman
was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Economic
Council, which controls Aramco, the giant oil company
that deals with a third of the world’s oil reserves. At
the end of last year, Bin Salman launched what he
called “2030” as a strategic vision for Saudi Arabia. In
addition, more than 200 Saudi emir and businessmen
were arrested in corruption cases. More than 100
billion dollars in reserves were seized, according to the
Saudi Attorney General. Furthermore, the detainees
have a number of the most pioneer Arab media
outlets, such as Arabic and Rutana channels. Hence,
this will place more economic and media power in the
hands of the Crown Prince.
On the religious level, dozens of influential preachers
and sheikhs were arrested. Also, the religious police,
“Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice” was stripped of their power in
arresting citizens without a prior parliamentary order.
Moreover, extensive cultural changes have been
launched, including women’s right to drive, and
popular celebrations of national holidays and
entertainment.
The above-mentioned changes even spread to
regional parties. To illustrate, Lebanese Prime Minister
Saad Hariri submitted his resignation, which as many
argued was a result of Saudi pressure. In addition, the
Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, was called to
Riyadh urgently. Attitudes continue to appear
between US backing for the Crown Prince’s actions
and a European protest over Saudi moves, which
could hit Paris and Berlin. This has created suspicions
PAL PAPERS
December 2017
Latest Developments in Saudi Arabia and their Internal and Regional Consequences on
the Palestinian Cause.
By Omar Shaban
-- 1 of 9 --
that the anti-corruption campaign is not only an
internal affair, in order to actually fight corruption, or
to prove the ruling pillars of the rising prince, but
beyond that, it could be part of steps to create the
environment for future regional changes. The Saudi
economy is facing a difficult privatization challenge.
Outside, the Kingdom faces a prolonged war in
Yemen, a crisis in the Gulf with Qatar, intense,
regional rivalry with Iran, and a security challenge
with militant groups.
Second: the causes of the crisis
Developments in Saudi Arabia in the presence of
different internal and external challenges lead to
searching for the causes and motives of the crisis.
1.The internal causes and motives of the crisis
Reconfiguration the features of the new
power's map and the kingdom's wealth and
the DE concentration of power in the hands
of the Saudi Crown Prince. Furthermore,
Saudi Arabia no longer wants to keep its self-
preservation and its leading for Saudi state in
the same way it did previously. Noticeably,
there is a major transformation, approaching
an absolute monarchy or let's say a fourth
Saudi state in which the traditional loyalty of
Al Saud family goes to Al Salman.
The elimination of political forces and their
concentration in the King's hands,
overcoming some of the Crown Prince's
opponents and his rivals within the royal
family itself, anticipating their mobilization
against him, prosecuting those who confront,
or obstruct, or threaten his rule, disposing of
the religious authority and concentrating it in
the king's hands while reducing the influence
of religious institutions and sectors and even
the effect of the conservative clerics to move
from one religious reality to another . By
this, they would be able to implement
religious reforms that bring the kingdom back
to moderate Islam and make Saudi Arabia
less politicized in order to consolidate the
governance, eliminate the centers of
financial forces, and recruit the
businessmen's funds needed to implement
the vision of 2030. 2030 vision includes
establishing a huge city called "Nyum" in the
North-West of the kingdom that is worth of
500 billion $ in order to show that his style of
leadership is the best way forward.
Introducing the Saudi landscape for the
privatization of Aramco. This is partly due to
the reality that many of the royal family's
members and the old guard have made up a
wealth of Saudi Aramco payments. It means
they would have opposed his steps which
would have negatively affected his economic
plans and his reputation as a ruler who is
unable to fulfill his promises. At large, this
helps the Crown Prince gain international
support, especially the United States' for his
role's stabilization since the US president
explicitly has asked Saudi Arabia to privatize
Aramco.
2.External causes of the crisis
Facing Iran's expansion in the region:
The kingdom finds how it is surrounded
by dangers and threats, started by the
US-Iranian relationship that led to a
nuclear agreement, a US retreat from
change in Syria with reinforcing the
Iranian influence there, as well as a
fierce conflict with Iran, which controls
four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus,
Beirut, and San'a, and its allies. In
addition, the Houthi rocket attack on
Riyadh exacerbated the conflict and
revealed Iran's transition to a direct
strike strategy rather than a strategy of
encircling the Gulf by controlling the
waterways in the Strait of Hormuz in the
Arabian Gulf. It also seeks controlling
Bab al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea
which affects transferring Petrol and
energy from the Gulf to Europe, America,
and Asia.
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Facing the Muslim Brotherhood's
Thought: There is a Saudi belief that
considers implementing religious
reforms will counter the Muslim
Brotherhood's perspective and its impact
on the Arab socio-political context. It
considers the politicization led by
Islamists has long been detrimental to
the natural dialogue on the Palestinian-
Israeli issue, perpetuating the tragedy of
the Palestinians while portraying Israel
as the devil. Thus, it created a social
sphere that generates conspiracy
theories and it jeopardizes the stability
of Saudi Arabia and of the region. This
achieves two objectives: to prepare the
Saudi and the Arab public opinion for
rapprochement with Israel on the one
hand, and to counter the Turkish-Qatari
expansion by addressing the political
Islam groups associated with their
regional project.
Third: Crisis Scenarios
It is true that these actions and measures were
welcomed by large sections of the new
generation, particularly after the Crown Prince
announced that their goal is to tackle corruption,
return to real, moderate Islam, and achieve social
reforms. However, they are still facing opposition
from large sectors of both conservative and civil
forces for they affect their interests and influence.
This increases the possibility of repercussions
presence on the top issues in the region,
especially since the relationship are no longer
governed by the same family considerations or
previous balances. Moreover, political positions
on regional and international issues are not
identical, although they are largely compatible.
Therefore, in order to understand the future of
great, accelerating changes, whether they are
successful or not, and their implications for the
stability of the kingdom and its political system,
and of the region, it is needed to recognize the
possible scenarios:
Scenario 1: The internal situation in the
Kingdom, which includes two scenarios:
The Crown Prince's success Scenario:
The Crown Prince may succeed in establishing a
new iron rule, in which wealth and power are
exclusively concentrated in the ruler's hands
rather than the ruling family. Indeed, success will
not be easy. The Crown Prince will have to face
troublesome internal and external challenges,
foremost, to revive the Saudi economy, in the
context of oil prices decline. He also has to
confront the consequences of the rapid cultural
and religious change in the Kingdom, to achieve
stable security, and to ensure that there are no
internal political divisions, especially among
security institutions. He has to maintain a new
system based on the concentration of power,
responsibility, the absence of diversity, and
capable institutions of absorbing and change. At
the same time, he has to manage difficult
external challenges, such as the relationship with
Iran, the Gulf crisis, and international relations in
the post-Trump era without political or diplomatic
losses that weaken his internal appearance.
The Kingdom's conflagration Scenario:
The Crown Prince's steps reflect great risks. To
illustrate, Saudi Arabia is not an absolute
property; it is based on very accurate and
complex balances within the royal family, not
outside. Furthermore, security institutions and
wealth are distributed within different branches
of the ruling family to ensure no one gets the
power alone. They also rely on the religious
institution support and on the policies of the state
rent, which guarantees the loyalty of the Saudi
people and their believing of the distribution of oil
revenues. These balances, as built by the
Founding Fathers, cause balance in power and
the participation of various groups of the royal
family. They, moreover, provide kind of legitimacy
to the ruler; and the king is the result of this
consensus around him. Nevertheless, as the
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Crown Prince dismantles this long-standing
structure, he reduces sources of legitimacy and
focuses responsibility in his hands. By that, he
increases the dissatisfaction of the opponents
and a wide range of contradictions will surround
him; hence, this produces weak institutions and
causes huge, sudden changes. Opponents will
gradually assemble themselves, and whenever
they can, they will come back to counter and
unseat him or even when he mostly needs his
family consensus and the Kingdom's power
forces. The governance transition increased the
discontentment in Saudi Arabia. Bin Salman
ignored the royal family objection to the arrests
against powerful princes, such as Prince Mteb bin
Abdullah, the former Minister of National Guard.
Scenario 2: The situation in Lebanon that
leads to two scenarios
Read justment: this scenario depends on the
Hezbollah and its coalition's rationality and
pragmatism, as well as Iranian considerations.
This approach depends on the possible
concessions that could be offered by Hezbollah to
build confidence; similar to the concessions
previously accepted by Al-Hariri in last year's
agreement. The most important of these
concessions may be by the Hezbollah acceptance
of the three conditions set by Prime Minister Saad
Hariri to go back on resignation: „safeguarding
(the Taif Agreement) and the national
reconciliation premises, the actual
implementation of self-restraint, and not harming
the relations with the Arab countries." Through
withdrawal from Syria and refraining from
interfering in the Arab countries affairs,
specifically Yemen and Bahrain or by accepting a
totally new government in which their party will
not be represented so that the Lebanese
government does not constitute a cover for
Hezbollah in the affairs of the region's countries.
Internal crises: based on this scenario, Hezbollah
will refuse to act according to the principle of
self-restraint that Hariri demands for his post as a
prime minister. The party will continue to
intervene in the region's affairs as a tool of the
outer, Iranian policy. This will lead to the outbreak
of the crisis, the resignation of the Prime Minister
again, and the refusal to return to a political
partnership of Hezbollah in no way due to
Hezbollah intransigence and their refusal to
follow the rules of reconciliation, heading for
escalation. Accordingly, several constitutional,
military, and financial crises will break out
because the Saudi and Gulf measures are
temporarily suspended. These measures target
Lebanese expatriate labor, the financial sector,
and tourism. If the Kingdom succeeds in
achieving this goal, it will certainly have a
devastating impact on the situation inside
Lebanon. This will lead to popular protests to
pressure Hezbollah to return to the rules of the
settlement, which could escalate into armed
confrontations difficult to be overcome if Syrian
refugees were armed. Bombings or political
assassinations may be reproduced in Lebanon;
chaos and conflict would lead to a regional and
international confrontation due to the internal
crisis in light of the Lebanese split and its external
interactions in the regional alignment, Saudi-
Iranian confrontation, and Hezbollah's regional
roles' expansion and their interrelatedness with
the current crisis. Afterthought, the crisis
continues until the power forces are re-
established in the regional arena and its
repercussions on the Lebanese scene reappear.
Scenario 3: The Palestinian Issue:
Clearly, the new American vision in the region
speaks of shifting from enforcing the
democratization strategy on the Arab region or
the Arab Spring to cooperating with the existing
Arab regimes in an attempt of forming an Arab-
Israeli regional hub that will deal with terrorism
and Iranian expansion. This requires a settlement
on the Palestinian track to save the Arabs of the
embarrassment of joining it. Consequently, calling
President Mahmoud Abbas to Saudi Arabia made
sense for the United States with its relationship
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with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo to pressure
the Palestinian side to accept the Trump Deal,
which revolves around the two-state solution and
the postponement of Jerusalem. It aims at the
achievement of full Arab normalization between
the Arabs and Israel, in exchange of generous
financial aid to the Palestinian authority and a
solution to the issue of refugees. It also includes
an explicit Israeli demand that the Israeli army
remain in the Palestinian territories and in the
border areas of the Jordan Valley. Israel, based
on this deal, asks for the Arab normalization with
it before a full settlement with the Palestinians is
achieved. It is expected that the Kingdom will
supplement its efforts on the Palestinian track in
implementing the Arab initiative in consultation
with the Palestinian Authority as it strengthens its
regional status. Furthermore, it provides a legal
cover for its relationship with Israel, along with
some modifications in its efforts, to form a broad,
regional front to counter Iranian influence in the
region and then move the situation in Lebanon.
The Jordanian Kingdom fears Saudi Arabia's
willingness to give up the Palestinian' right to
return in exchange of Jerusalem under
international sovereignty as a part of peace seal
of the Middle East with Israel to facilitate a Saud-
Israeli alliance to confront Iran. Jordan believes
that ending the right of return will cause
disorders in its kingdom for half of the Jordanian
population is Palestinians. It also considers this
agreement will undermine the special situation
played by Jordan as a patron of Al-Haram al-
Sharif in Jerusalem. Saudi Arabia has expressed
its willingness to raise the monthly funding of the
Palestinian Authority, but demanded that Hamas
give up its relations with Iran. Speaking about the
Palestinian role within Lebanon if the internal
situation there explodes, the required, constant
Palestinian policy is self-indulgence in the Arab
crises and rejection of the Palestinian presence in
favor of any party, especially as the positions and
perspectives of the Palestinian factions are not
united; thus, any Arab or regional dispute will
turn into a Palestinian civil war.
Scenario 4: Continuation to the regional
conflict:
1- Saudi-Iranian conflict
Iran will not abandon its project known as the
state of the crescent (Al—Helal), especially after
its features began to be formed after controlling
the four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus,
Beirut and Sana'a. Iran will continue to intervene
in the rest of the Arab squares through its allies,
as it leads a comprehensive Iranian attack in the
region, which escalated and accelerated after the
fall of the constraint that was represented by the
regime of Saddam Hussein. Iran has already
agreed with Syria, on the eve of the US invasion
of Iraq, to prevent the establishment of a stable
government in Baghdad under the US presence.
The day after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the
two sides also decided to prevent the
establishment of a stable government in Lebanon
after the Syrian forces had to withdraw from. Iran
was the main player in the depletion of Oslo
agreement and what happened in Palestine. It
will continue to support the Huthis in Yemen and
escalate the war against Saudi Arabia. It will
continue to move Shiite minorities in the Arab
countries to drop what it can from the Arab
states. It intervenes in Bahrain, exploits the
situation in Qatar to strengthen its influence, and
continues to control Hezbollah's policies and their
outer interventions. Moreover, Iran continues to
support some Palestinian factions as a card of its
external policy. Iran clearly has no real opposition
to its activities in the region, where the United
States has signed a nuclear deal with it and is not
seriously considering its interference in Syria,
Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will continue to
escalate against Iran and Hezbollah to confront
the Iranian expansion, in an attempt to change
the current status in Lebanon and to establish its
hegemony. One of the signs of this is the
resignation of Hariri and the condemnation of the
Arab League Council for Iranian intervention in
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the region on 19/11/2017 and demanding an
emergency session of the Security Council to
decide on the matter. The Kingdom will continue
to participate in the framework of the regional
alignment and the large campaign led by the
Trump administration against Iran, supported by
Israel. The kingdom continues to see Iran as a
direct threat by intervening in the war in Yemen
and supporting the Huthis who have escalated
the war by targeting Riyadh by a ballistic missile,
its control of four Arab capitals and its continued
support of Shiite minorities in the Gulf states to
provoke chaos.
2. The Arab-Turkish conflict
The Turkish-Qatari regional hub is monitoring the
developments and managing relations with all
sides, as it intersects with Iran sometimes when it
comes to the Kurdish issue, and varies by it in
Syria. It agrees politically with Saudi Arabia in
Syria and disagrees with it in Egypt. This hub has
its different project of enabling political Islam to
overthrow the two parties as much as possible
and controls two capitals, Doha and Khartoum,
and other political groups, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood. The second is to confront the
Muslim Brotherhood and their ideology in the
region, and to confront the currents of political
Islam affiliated with Turkey, which is striving to
complete the draft access to governance in the
region to achieve the Turkish project.
Scenario 5: Ongoing international
engagement with regional conflicts
The international powers are taking advantage of
the conflict to carry out their interests. The United
States is pushing for the region to be involved in
a major conflict. It is trying to form a regional
alliance against Iran while at the same time
running a nuclear deal with it and not taking
seriously its presence in Syria and its support for
the Houthis. The United States seeks to make the
conflict with Iran a substitute for the traditional
conflict in the region with Israel, and even an
entry into Israeli-Arab cooperation against Iran
that goes beyond the Arab consensus to find a
settlement to the Palestinian issue before
normalizing relations with Israel according to the
Arab initiative. It is also exploiting the Iranian
threat to blackmail the Arabs, pass a deal for
Israel and market more arms deals. In general, it
can be said that the involvement of the region in
the conflict of the axes will be at the expense of
the Palestinian cause, and will leave the
destruction, where the stability and development
of the Arab region are almost lost. The United
States and Israel will be the biggest winners.
Russia is exploiting conflicts in the region to
achieve its interests, meeting Iran in Syria and at
the same time developing its relationship with
Saudi Arabia in the areas of investment in Russia,
joint oil pricing and the arms trade. Russia views
the region's conflicts as an opportunity for new
geopolitical gains and a challenge to American
hegemony in the realization of Putin's Russian
vision of "developing Russia's role in a multi-polar
world without the supremacy of a single
superpower." The region enjoys an important
geo-strategic position in the two global strategies
of the Russian Federation and the United States.
Europe does not prefer the deterioration of the
situation again for the waves of migration and
terrorism, and the loss of influence in some
squares, such as Lebanon in the event of slipping
into chaos again.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the
region is heading towards more disorder and
escalation in light of the Turkish-Iranian
rapprochement in the region, whose interests
converged in two areas: Qatar, where the two
countries rejected the Arab measures against
Qatar and Turkey sent military forces to protect
the Qatari regime. Iran provided economic
support and opened its doors In the Iraqi arena,
where the two countries agreed to support the
central government against the Kurds after the
organization of Kurdistan referendum on
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secession from Iraq, for fear of the Kurds claim
the two countries independence. If the
relationship between the two countries develops,
it will pose a direct threat to the Gulf countries
through the Iranian gate and its traditional
conflict with these countries, and a threat to
Egypt and the rest of the region through the
Turkish portal through the mobilization of political
Islam groups. The confrontation will continue in
the battlefields of the proxy, such as Yemen, Syria
and Lebanon, and may develop into direct
confrontations if new variables are introduced
into the conflict environment similar to the Houthi
missile that targeted Riyadh.
In the face of this open confrontation, Saudi
Arabia will increase its openness to Israel and will
try to push for a settlement of the Palestinian
issue as a necessity to ally itself with Israel in the
face of what it sees as regional threats to its
security, stability and security of the entire region.
Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to ignite the
Lebanese arena as much as possible to alter the
balance of open confrontation with Iran.
The Century Deal and Trump's Decision on
Jerusalem and Possible Scenarios:
The American administration's actions and recent
Trump's decisions were in a follow-up to changes and
transformations. Trump administration's decision on
Jerusalem has three main possibilities. The first is the
administration’s attempt to rally support for Israel and
the…
Topic: Regional & International Politics — Saudi Arabia · MbS · Palestine · Rosa Luxemburg · regional order — Text © Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung — archived here with attribution to the source. — Original source