Media coverage
Orient XXI · 2018-11-08
Omar Shaban warns that the Gaza Strip is nearing a comprehensive collapse بسبب the Israeli blockade, the impact of repeated wars, the reduction in UNRWA funding, and the continuing Palestinian division, which has deepened the economic, social, and political crisis. He argues that saving Gaza requires immediate action to end the division, lift the blockade, and prevent Gaza’s separation from the broader Palestinian national framework.
Omar Shaban warns that the Gaza Strip is nearing a comprehensive collapse بسبب the Israeli blockade, the impact of repeated wars, the reduction in UNRWA funding, and the continuing Palestinian division, which has deepened the economic, social, and political crisis. He argues that saving Gaza requir…
Interview with Omar Shaban ·
Any collapse of the Gaza Strip would drag grave consequences for the Palestinian cause as a whole, and even for Israel itself. Omar Shaban, director of the Palestinian think-and-dialogue institution “PalThink” in Gaza, sounds the alarm: the Israeli blockade, the effects of successive wars on the Strip, and cuts to the UNRWA budget all represent looming dangers for Gaza, while the division within the Palestinian movement also poses a serious threat.
PalThink for Strategic Studies is an independent Palestinian institution that does not belong to any political organization and does not receive support from any official body. It was established in Gaza in March 2007 by a group of researchers. It works to promote dialogue, methodical scientific discussion, and the finding of solutions to the challenges facing Palestine now and in the future. It has worked in the field of achieving Palestinian reconciliation and produced the first paper entitled “A Roadmap for Palestinian Reconciliation.”1
Nadia Yafi — Could you describe for us the current economic situation in Gaza?
Omar Shaban — The Gaza Strip faces various chronic challenges. There are many indicators that foretell an imminent collapse if the accumulated conditions of exhaustion continue. The Israeli blockade on the one hand, and the repeated wars on the other, have left enormous destruction in the infrastructure and all economic activities. These are factors that have contributed to the worsening of the economic crisis over past years and up to the present day. In addition to the challenges facing the Palestinian cause as a whole, as a result of many different factors, including the slow pace of the national reconciliation process after 11 years of a division that has been devastating for the cause and society. It is no longer possible to remain silent or to manage through mere calming measures this catastrophic situation experienced by the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip, which has been described as the largest open-air prison in the world. The economic situation is difficult to describe because of the severity of the accumulated hardships within it. A tight Israeli blockade was imposed in June 2007 with Hamas’s takeover of power in the Gaza Strip after a year of internal fighting between it and the Palestinian Authority, and the Authority’s control receded to the West Bank areas only. This coastal strip, whose area does not exceed 360 km2, is crowded with two million inhabitants, and 75 percent of its people live in 8 refugee camps. Despite the Israeli withdrawal from inside the Gaza Strip in 2005, Israel still controls the movement of goods and people to and from Gaza and also controls the sea and the airspace. The movement of residents out is restricted to two main crossings: the Rafah Crossing and the Erez (Beit Hanoun) Crossing, which is controlled by the Israeli authorities, and the Rafah Crossing, which is controlled by the Egyptian authorities and is closed most of the time. This narrow patch of land witnessed three Israeli wars in a few years: the first war in December 2008, the second war in July 2012, and the third war in August 2014, which was extremely deadly and destructive. These successive wars led to the complete destruction of more than 40,000 homes and public institutions, in addition to the partial destruction of more than 100,000 buildings. Most of those homes, partially or totally destroyed, still remain as they are; they have not yet been rebuilt because of the lack of international funding and the state of instability that makes donor countries hesitate to pay what they pledged. It was expected that they would be rebuilt by the National Consensus Government that was formed in June 2014, but unfortunately half of the homes and factories are still in a pitiful condition.
N. Y. — Do international relief institutions not make any contribution?
O. S. — There is a difference between institutions. All American institutions, for example, boycott any local institution with a political character linked to the political and military forces in the Gaza Strip, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for example. That boycott has caused complications in delivering aid to all those entitled to it. Meanwhile, institutions that rely on Islamic and Arab funding (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) work with these groups that do not benefit from Western funding.
N. Y. — What about the organizations affiliated with the United Nations? How has the reduction in the budget of the refugee relief organization, UNRWA, translated on the ground?
O. S. — It has given the Strip a catastrophic condition. The percentage of those living below the poverty line has reached 70 percent, and the unemployment rate is more than 53 percent, according to the World Bank report issued in September 2018. This has contributed to transforming Palestinian society in Gaza from a productive society into a relief-dependent society. UNRWA, for example, used to implement many youth and women’s employment programs in its health and education projects and provide them with work opportunities for a few months, and these have shrunk or stopped because of financial pressures and the reduced budget. The organization has also begun dismissing permanent employees, who are Palestinians, which affects many families.
N. Y. — It is said that the situation has become so hopeless that it is driving young people and women in particular into these demonstrations called the Marches of Return at the border with Israel, where they confront live bullets with their bare chests. Is this not a kind of suicide?
O. S. — I would not say suicide, but rather despair, without a doubt. It is a stark protest against an unbearable situation. There is no doubt that the deteriorating living situation plays a fundamental role in these demonstrations. The Gaza Strip wants its voice to be heard by the world. It can be said that the “Marches of Return” have achieved many important accomplishments and failed to achieve other goals, which is only natural under these circumstances. In my view, one of the most important strategic achievements of the Marches of Return is that they proved that the Palestinian struggle remains burning and continuous; it has not been extinguished by the humiliating state of Arab retreat and fragmentation. They have also raised many questions about the extent of the peaceful nature of these marches and the extent of their credibility, especially since their toll is 217 martyrs and more than 22,897 wounded, some of whom will continue their lives with permanent disabilities.
N. Y. — Are there attempts at reconciliation between the National Authority and Hamas?
The attempts have not ceased, but they have not borne fruit so far. There were 8 agreements in the past, through conciliatory meetings held in several Arab countries, but they did not achieve consensus on the ground. On 23 April 2014, a reconciliation agreement was reached in al-Shati Camp in Gaza that produced the formation of a National Consensus Government at the beginning of June of the same year, but this government did not actually function in the Gaza Strip, and the two sides exchanged accusations of sabotaging it.
Egyptian efforts in particular continued in order to achieve actual reconciliation and leave behind the state of division, to no avail. Since the end of October, an Egyptian security delegation has been making shuttle visits to Gaza and the West Bank, through which it seeks to revive the Cairo Agreement that had been reached in May 2011 and was amended in a subsequent agreement on 12 October 2017.
N. Y. — And what about the National Consensus Government that was formed at that time? What is the reality of authority on the ground?
O. S. — Effective authority in Gaza still remains completely in Hamas’s hands, whether in governmental work, which includes around 24,000 employees hired by the Hamas government since June 2007, or in the security, police, and judiciary situation supervised by around 17,000 employees. When the National Consensus Government was formed, 4 ministers from Gaza were appointed. These move back and forth between Ramallah and Gaza, where they live, but they do not participate in governing there, and they have no ministerial offices or staff attached to them.2
N. Y. — What about the cohesion of Hamas in power? Are there rival currents within it? Does Islamic Jihad constitute a competitor to it on the ground?
A. Sh. — There is no doubt that there are multiple currents within the Hamas movement, as is the case in all party formations and social and political structures. Some speak of “Hamas inside,” while others at times refer to “political Hamas” as opposed to “military Hamas.” In reality, we do not know how decisions are made within Hamas, but what we do observe is that once a decision is issued, everyone abides by it. With regard to Islamic Jihad, I do not believe there is competition, as it is a movement that does not believe in elections and does not struggle with Hamas over governance. There is also a difference between the two movements in that Islamic Jihad is closer to Iran than to Arab countries despite being Sunni in doctrine, but apart from that it agrees with Hamas on the central line of resisting Israel.
N. Y. — There is a Palestinian proposal for a long-term truce between Hamas and Israel. But in the absence of reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority, some Palestinians believe that this may contribute to entrenching the division between the West Bank and Gaza. Does that not move in the direction of the proposed American solution through the “Deal of the Century” proposed by U.S. President Trump, which separates Gaza from the Palestinian system?
A. Sh. — Indeed, many Palestinians fear that a truce in the absence of reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah will consolidate the current division, especially since there is no geographical contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, distancing has occurred between the two societies, and each has grown increasingly different in its nature, composition, ways of life, and culture, something that was not so evident under Arafat’s rule. Today, each area has its own concepts and priorities. However, it is not permissible, under the pretext that reconciliation has not yet been achieved, for Gaza to remain in this unbearable condition, deteriorating day after day. It cannot remain hostage to reconciliation while war is at the door. The Egyptian delegation that has, since the end of October, been making shuttle visits to Gaza is working in both directions simultaneously: that is, to reach an easing of the blockade on Gaza and establish a truce, as well as reconciliation with the Authority. This pairing of the two objectives is what will safeguard Gaza’s belonging to the Palestinian system as a whole.
N. Y. — What do you say to those who doubt the Egyptian position and accuse Egypt of benefiting from the “Deal of the Century” by developing the Sinai desert at Gaza’s expense?
A. Sh. — I can state with certainty that this is incorrect, and I have information that confirms this. Egypt’s position completely rejects a split among the Palestinians. The catastrophic situation in Gaza harms security interests in Sinai. Egypt categorically rejects resolving the crisis of the Gaza Strip through expansion into Sinai. Egypt is mandated by the League of Arab States to deal with the Palestinian file, and therefore it continues its attempts to achieve rapprochement and relieve the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.
N. Y. — Is Egypt’s position also opposed to the “Deal of the Century”?
A. Sh. — We have heard much about it, but this plan is itself unknown and has not been presented to the media. We do not have clear information about its provisions. All we have learned is that it included from the outset approval of the U.S. administration’s declaration of القدس as Israel’s unified capital, the attempt to politically dismantle UNRWA and dry it up financially. This is something that all Arab states rejected. But does that advance or delay what is happening on the ground? The Arab position is weak; indeed, it is pressuring the Palestinian side to accept the American vision for a solution. I do not think the Arab position is strong enough to stop the policies of the Trump administration in the Middle East.
N. Y. — In your view, what future prospects are taking shape for Gaza, and for Palestine in general?
A. Sh. — The continuation of the internal Palestinian division for a long period constitutes an immediate and long-term strategic threat, as it has produced societal, political, and economic transformations, intended or unintended, which in turn have contributed to deepening the separation between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, and to creating groups and parties with an interest in the continuation of the division, which may make it difficult to restore unity. This threatens the Palestinian condition as a whole. Political disagreements in our society are no longer subject to the rule of “difference within the framework of unity”; rather, they have become a dispute affecting everything that is constant and sacred. What is now required nationally is to transcend this condition, give priority to the national interest, and refrain from betting on regional, Arab, and international changes.
The slowdown of the national reconciliation process, on which the Palestinians of the Strip rely to emerge from their multiple and compounded crises, warns of a comprehensive collapse in the societal, cultural, and political system, and pushes the Strip toward internal fighting and military escalation with Israel.
It is no longer permissible for the Palestinian parties—official and civil alike—and the forces of the international community to remain silent or be content with patchwork solutions, for they are no longer sufficient. What is required is immediate and comprehensive intervention that includes leaving the state of internal division, lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip, and taking real action to declare the Gaza Strip a disaster area requiring intervention at all levels.
1 The institution also produced a working paper to resolve the crisis of the governmental apparatus between Hamas and the Authority. It presented many working papers on the electricity crisis, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, and municipal elections. The institution works regularly with women and youth and supports civil society organizations. PalThink is an active member of many Euro-Mediterranean partnerships.
2 They participate in the weekly ministerial meetings in Ramallah, sometimes via Skype.
Official translator into Arabic, former diplomat, and former director of the Center for Arabic Language and Civilization at the Arab World Institute.
Text © Orient XXI — archived here with attribution to the source. — Machine translation for archival reference. — Original source