Media coverage
Al-Hadath (Ramallah) · 2026-08
The cover file of Al-Hadath (issue 197, August 2026) canvasses eight Palestinian researchers, economists and business figures on the plans tabled for rebuilding the Gaza Strip. They are united in warning that bypassing the Palestinian leadership, or confining Palestinians to technical implementation alone, would weaken any prospect of sustainability and create real risks to sovereignty and legitimacy. Dr Omar Shaban, founder and director of PalThink for Strategic Studies, doubts that the world, Arab states included, is prepared to fund reconstruction; he calls tabling such plans now a kind of luxury that does not match reality, and argues they should be shelved in favour of relief and reducing daily suffering for as long as the crossings remain under Israeli control and the war continues.
The cover file of Al-Hadath (issue 197, August 2026) canvasses eight Palestinian researchers, economists and business figures on the plans tabled for rebuilding the Gaza Strip. They are united in warning that bypassing the Palestinian leadership, or confining Palestinians to technical implementatio…
Palestinian researchers, economists, and businesspeople warn of the danger of bypassing the Palestinian role in the Gaza Strip reconstruction plan or confining it to technical implementation only. They have also declared their rejection of reconstruction plans as a tool for reimposing control that undermines Palestinian sovereignty. They regard the Palestinian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza as a solid foundation for a political approach or as a basis for negotiations carrying a national program, and they call for the consensual restructuring of the Palestinian political system in a way that demonstrates and affirms the geographical unity of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including occupied Jerusalem.
These warnings come amid the large number of plans that have been put forward for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and their renewed activation after Hamas reaffirmed its full commitment to implementing the plan of U.S. President Donald Trump, in a manner that ensures ending the humanitarian suffering and reconstructing the Strip, along with its agreement to disarm, at a time when the occupying state has not committed to the immediate cessation of its military operations in Gaza and persists in the policy of bombing buildings and assassinations, nor have its military forces withdrawn from the Strip as stipulated by the plan, which also called for the start of comprehensive reconstruction operations in the Gaza Strip under a new Palestinian civilian administration. This is the aspect to which the Palestinian community of researchers and economists attaches great importance, focusing on its implementation but with Palestinian ideas and horizons.
They believe that early recovery must come first, as it constitutes the basis for any process of reconstructing the Gaza Strip. Therefore, they agree on the importance of having a unified national reference framework on which various planning and reconstruction efforts can rely, stressing that the success of any plan remains linked to determining the form of rule and governance in the Strip. They also stressed that the Palestinian plan must be the primary reference for any regional or international reconstruction efforts, in a manner that ensures their consistency with national priorities and needs.
Warning against bypassing the Palestinian role and confining it to technical implementation
Businesspeople, researchers, and economists warn that any plan that bypasses the Palestinian leadership or confines the Palestinians’ role to technical implementation only would weaken the chances of sustainability and create serious risks to sovereignty and legitimacy, even if it appears financeable in the short term. They stress the importance of integrating the Palestinian private sector into any reconstruction track, not as a substitute for the public role or for the requirements of social justice, but rather as a national lever to enhance employment and reactivate local production. Therefore, they call for the proposed plans to be reviewed and corrected in a way that serves sovereignty and the unity of geography, and for avoiding approaches that turn reconstruction into a gateway to long-term tutelage.
Most plans ignore Palestinians as political actors and partners in planning
Researchers and economists agree that the density of plans and proposals that appeared over the past year cannot be understood merely as technical responses to the ongoing war on the Gaza Strip, but also as early attempts to foresee and reshape the features of the political, social, and urban system in Palestine through the gateway of the “day after.” They stress that the importance of reading these plans does not stem only from the ability to deconstruct them or from technical criticism, but from the fact that doing so is a sovereign act within the course of a gradual recovery of the symbolic—and to some extent—cognitive decision regarding the future of Palestine.
They affirm that most plans ignore Palestinians as political actors and partners in planning, and view them as objects acted upon. Only some plans are exempt from this logic, such as the Gaza Phoenix Plan, or the national plan prepared by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. They therefore see most of these plans as lacking recognition of the Palestinian self as a sovereign or cognitive reference, whether at the official or popular level. Since reconstruction is not a technical act, the political and sovereign dimension must be taken into account.
While they do not reject these plans wholesale, they seek to redirect the compass toward Palestinian national interests and not accept reconstruction as a tool for reimposing control and undermining Palestinian sovereignty. Therefore, the Palestinian plan emerged in parallel with these plans, and it can be regarded as a bold project that entrenches the attainment of sovereignty and development. This plan may be a solid foundation for a political approach or a basis for negotiations carrying a national program.
The World Bank, based on a joint assessment with the United Nations and the European Union, estimates recovery and reconstruction needs in the Gaza Strip at about $71.5 billion, indicating the unprecedented scale of the destruction that has affected infrastructure, housing, economic sectors, and basic services. It warns that the Palestinian economy is nearing a “breaking point,” noting that the current year 2026 may be its worst.
Four scenarios for reconstruction tracks in the “day after” phase
Maseef Maseef, the economic researcher at the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), presented four general scenarios for reconstruction tracks, without assuming that any of them would necessarily materialize. He said: “In practical terms, these scenarios may overlap, follow one another, or change according to changes in the political environment, and a new track may emerge for political, security, and financial reasons,” asking: What makes a given plan actionable in a certain context? And what makes it less actionable or higher risk in another context?
Scenario of Palestinian leadership under a regional/international umbrella
According to Maseef, this scenario is based on official elected Palestinian leadership of the reconstruction process, including the ministries, municipalities, the residents of Gaza, and the Palestine Liberation Organization in its capacity as the legitimate representative of the residents of the Gaza Strip in the General Assembly and in the diaspora, thereby ensuring a broader scope of political representation, with organized Arab and international support and within a coordination framework for donors, alongside a gradual transition from the early recovery phase to the reconstruction phase, and linking reconstruction to the unity of Palestinian geography and the return of institutions to work, under relative ceasefire stability and international/regional acceptance of a leading Palestinian role alongside arrangements related to crossings and flows of materials that allow implementation. This scenario makes it possible to enhance legitimacy and accountability locally, increase the chances of building local content in implementation (employment, contracting, supply), and reduce the risks of long-term tutelage.
As for the potential risks, according to Maseef, they lie in the politicization or delay of funding, weak absorptive and institutional capacity in the first months, and the risk of fragmenting programs if funding channels multiply without a unified reference point.
Scenario of short-term international transitional governance
Maseef says: “This scenario is based on the formation of a transitional arrangement managed or supervised internationally (under an external political mandate) for a limited period defined as a transitional phase for managing stability and reconstruction, with varying Palestinian presence often confined to technical implementation or advisory levels. This scenario is activated through strong international political support, and financial support conditioned on the Palestinian Authority not intervening in decision-making.”
Scenario of conditional investment-led reconstruction led by the private sector with external security arrangements
This scenario, according to Mousaif’s proposition, is based on steering the reconstruction process toward a portfolio of major investment projects founded on long-term contracts, concessions, and BOT formulas — Build-Operate-Transfer contracts — and PPPs — Public-Private Partnerships — with a clear linkage to security and risk management from an external perspective, and treating investment as a primary engine of recovery.
He continues: “Its potential risks, however, lie in weak social justice and unequal distribution of benefits, the dominance of a local class or influential faction, the marginalization of the local economy, risks to property, housing, and land rights, and the transformation of reconstruction into a concessions economy that entrenches long-term dependency instead of building a productive base.”
## The scenario of continuation of the status quo: fragmented and slow recovery under continuing restrictions
As for the fourth scenario, Mousaif assumes the absence of a comprehensive reconstruction path, with interventions turning into scattered projects (relief/rehabilitation/services), while restrictions on movement and materials continue, or cycles of tension return that prevent operational stability. It is characterized by the fragility of the ceasefire, continuing restrictions on crossings, multiple de facto authorities or weak coordination, and a decline in funding commitments or their diversion into humanitarian aid only.
He said: “Its most prominent expected outcomes are the rising cost of time (prolonging the recovery), the continuation of the economy of scarcity and intermediation, the erosion of human capital, and increasing social risks in the medium term — a situation similar to what prevails in the West Bank.”
Researcher Mousaif concludes that the aforementioned scenarios show that the success of any plan is not tied to the quality of its design alone, but to its alignment with a realistic political/security trajectory, and to its ability to reduce the anticipated risks in each scenario. Accordingly, the previous comparison is useful in determining which plans are closest to implementation in an environment of Palestinian leadership, which are nourished by the logic of tutelage, which rely on conditional investment, and which collapse in the face of a fragmented recovery scenario.
## The essence of the difference between reconstruction plans is political, not technical
Meanwhile, Yara Al-Salem — coordinator of the technical team for the Gaza Phoenix framework — criticizes the comparison made by Mousaif among 14 plans proposed for reconstruction in Gaza, including the Gaza Phoenix plan, given the differences in their points of departure, stressing that the essence of the difference among them is not so much technical as it is political. She emphasized the necessity for ownership of the reconstruction process to be Palestinian, and the need to give municipalities special attention, given their pivotal role in managing the reconstruction process and delivering services.
She said, by way of clarification: “Gaza is not empty land, and destruction does not erase memory or property rights,” noting that reconstruction is an overlapping process that goes beyond rebuilding housing and infrastructure, and calling for work to restore the ability of Palestinian society to rebuild itself and strengthen its resilience, while integrating early recovery plans with reconstruction plans within a comprehensive vision.
Al-Salem called for the need to distinguish between supervisory visions and operational programs, explaining that the Gaza Phoenix plan is not in competition with any other plan; rather, it raises the issue of operation within the recovery and reconstruction process and the ownership of reconstruction. She said: “In our plan, we did not focus on Palestinian participation, but rather on Palestinian ownership. It is very important to clarify that our plan is not a participatory community-based approach; rather, it linked preserving identity and the social fabric. We reject the proposition advanced by some that Gaza is empty land. Here we find that community participation is not a social activity appended to reconstruction, but rather an integral part of the governance process. The participation of all segments of Palestinian society shifts the center of gravity in the reconstruction process into Palestinian society and institutions — municipalities, the private sector, civil society institutions, specialists, and others.”
## Rejecting external tutelage and focusing on community participation, sovereignty, and the Palestinian decision
Al-Salem strongly renewed her emphasis on the role of municipalities, which in some countries are considered more important than the government’s role. She said: “In Gaza’s situation, when speaking about municipalities and existing Palestinian institutions, there is accumulated knowledge and institutional professional capacity, and we reject creating any alternative to replace them. Rather, one of the goals of reconstruction itself must be to rebuild the capacity of these institutions and municipalities and empower them to lead the process — meaning that the process of rebuilding institutions is an essential part of the reconstruction process.”
Al-Salem stressed the importance of not separating the phases of recovery and reconstruction, because it is an overlapping process within the available conditions and possibilities. Therefore, there must be parallel integration between recovery and reconstruction. She stressed the rejection of external tutelage, and the necessity for plans to focus on sovereignty, the Palestinian decision, community participation, the pivotal role of the private sector in the reconstruction process, the use of local resources, and linking recovery to reconstruction.
She said: “The fundamental value of the Phoenix is not that it presents another conception of what post-reconstruction Gaza could look like. Rather, its fundamental value is that the starting point is changed from rebuilding Gaza for the Palestinians to rebuilding Gaza led by the Palestinians, on the premise that the Palestinian is the صاحب الأرض والمعرفة والمؤسسة والقرار and not merely the beneficiary.”
## The Palestinian Authority prepares plans for donors remotely, and they are ineffective on the ground
Dr. Akram Al-Ajlah — coordinator of the Save Gaza Initiative/co-director of the University Center for Planning and Recovery — said: “No plan can succeed without understanding the features of stability, foremost among them: what is the form of governance in the Gaza Strip?” Under the current situation, Dr. Al-Ajlah considers that Gaza is living in a state of governance vacuum; the Palestinian Authority prepares plans for donors remotely, and they are ineffective on the ground, while Hamas exercises control by force to protect its rule, and it is outside the framework of the international system. In addition, the Peace Council, the Mladenov Office, and the Administrative Committee have also become new players. Recently, Dahlan has also emerged through the “Humanitarian City” project in Rafah. Therefore, there is ambiguity regarding the party that manages or owns a recovery or reconstruction plan.
## The response did not match the scale of the catastrophe on the ground
Dr. Al-Ajlah said: “All the plans that were previously built, including the Phoenix plan, were built on scenarios very far removed from the reality on the ground for years to come. They also lack people’s participation in preparing those plans. What distinguished the Phoenix plan is that it came at a sensitive time, when the Egyptian plan was announced, which later became Arab, and these were plans aimed at confronting the scheme of displacement and seizure of the Gaza Strip within the conceptions of Kushner. But the Egyptian plan, which the Palestinian Authority considers a Palestinian plan, was unfortunately appended with a spatial scheme that was reflected on the ground in what is now called the ‘yellow line.’ Unfortunately, what we see on the ground today is the Arab plan, as everything east of the yellow line has become a forbidden area, and Israel has become committed to this scheme, which displaced 964,000 Palestinians from Beit Hanoun in the north, through Al-Shuja’iyya and the cities east of Khan Younis, and ending in Rafah in the south.”
He said: “Anyone who abandoned the people in a time of storm and hardship will not be recognized by the public at the ballot box or in the form of governance. Unfortunately, the Palestinian Authority left the people to face their fate alone on the ground, to the point that Dr. Shalabi, adviser to the Minister of Finance and Planning, says that any plan must be ‘filtered’ through the Ministry of Planning. Does a catastrophe of the magnitude of the catastrophe and heroism in Gaza require only an administrative unit of five unrelated employees inside the Ministry of Planning to manage recovery and reconstruction?”
He continued: “Since the beginning of the aggression against Gaza, we in the Save Gaza Initiative have communicated with the majority of ministers, without exception, in the previous government and the current government. There was responsiveness and engagement from some ministers, but unfortunately the response was not commensurate with the scale of the catastrophe on the ground.”
He added: “The Gaza Strip is not ‘Hamas,’ and Gaza is not incapable or barren in terms of competencies, volunteers, and experts. Therefore, no plan will succeed unless the local community in Gaza is a partner in its preparation and a partner in the decision. Any planning, blueprint, or management of the recovery and reconstruction process in Gaza cannot succeed so long as there is no partnership with the local community, or so long as planning and management of emergency intervention and recovery continue to be conducted remotely, or if the process is confined merely to bringing in donor funding and managing it.”
We do not have the power to determine the best plan whose decisions will be turned into implementation
As for Ahmed al-Farra — founder and CEO of the PalInvest platform, which specializes in designing recovery systems and works on developing frameworks that link strategic vision with the policies, financing, and partnerships necessary for recovery and reconstruction — he believes that the problem is not the best plan, but rather the question of which plan’s decisions will be turned into implementation steps. Unfortunately, we do not have the power to determine which plan that will be. It is very important to look beyond financing decisions: what impact will they have? How can it be measured? What priorities will they respond to? How will they achieve them? And how, as Palestinians, will we monitor them?
Al-Farra stresses that it is very important to have agreement on a methodology of measurement that is acceptable from a Palestinian perspective, and very important to begin thinking, regardless of the plan, about what the benchmark is, what its outcome is, and which plan’s decisions will be turned into financing, and how this can be guaranteed.
He said: “Most importantly, Palestinian families in Gaza must feel the impact, and their suffering must move toward solutions and results. More importantly, we must begin measuring and linking Gaza with the rest of the Palestinian territories. Gaza cannot be separated from the West Bank and Jerusalem. It is also very important to look at which plans will turn into decisions, how the financing will be disbursed, and how it will achieve the required results. And if the time factor is delayed now, what is the solution to the daily suffering of the citizen living in a tattered tent in Gaza?”
Raising it now is a kind of luxury that is inconsistent with reality
Meanwhile, the economist Dr. Omar Shaban — founder and director of PalThink for Strategic Studies, Gaza Strip — questions the readiness of the world’s countries, including Arab states, to finance a reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip, basing this on declining international interest in reconstruction amid the continuation of the war and daily bombardment, asking: Who will finance reconstruction? And how can the priorities of states and supporting parties be determined when they have other crises and priorities?
Dr. Shaban confirms that some reconstruction plans were prepared without any Palestinian participation, which confirms that talking about reconstruction cannot be separated from the existing security and political reality, in light of the continued restrictions on bringing materials into the Strip and their being subject to Israeli approval.
Dr. Shaban considers the presentation of reconstruction plans at present to be a kind of luxury that is inconsistent with reality, and said: “About a year ago, the world stopped talking about reconstruction, which is an eminently political and security issue, whereas what is currently required is the provision of the minimum level of relief. The crisis is still ongoing in Gaza, under occupation, and the war continues. Israel controls the crossings, and nothing enters Gaza from the West Bank or Egypt except with Israeli approval. The black market still controls the Strip, and there are between 10 and 12 traders, some of whom have a daily income of one million shekels.”
Shaban believes that the world is changing and that economic interests and economic challenges harm everyone, and that the interests of states in this region or that are what govern their contribution to reconstruction. The question here is: what does Gaza have to offer? And who wants to pay in light of the financial crises everyone is experiencing? European citizens have dozens of questions: why should they pay their taxes to finance projects in a region that has been destroyed several times before? Who will pay, and why should they pay?
Shaban concludes with his belief that reconstruction plans should be put on the shelf and that the focus should be on the issue of reviving our people in the Gaza Strip and reducing the suffering they are enduring, and on how Palestinians can unite to confront the catastrophe of Jewish terrorism practiced by settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank.
He said: “We Palestinians are unfortunately more fragmented than ever before. We have the Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, and a committee supposedly tasked with managing affairs in the Gaza Strip is still, until now, living in a five-star hotel in Cairo. There are no financial pledges for it, and it does not possess any powers whatsoever except a mandate from the Peace Council, in which there is not a single Palestinian, and ‘Israel’ is the one controlling everyone. Consequently, the administrative and governmental issue is: who governs Gaza, who supervises the funds, and what capacities are available?”
A reconstruction plan succeeds only with centralized leadership
Eng. Mohammed al-Najjar — Director General of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) in the Gaza Strip — criticized al-Salem for speaking about municipalities while not mentioning in her plan institutions such as the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), which prepared damage assessment and reconstruction reports after every war in the series of wars to which the Gaza Strip has been subjected. Relevant institutions such as PECDAR, the Palestinian Housing Council, and the Coast Municipality, which has experience in reconstruction, should not be forgotten.
He said: “Before talking about any reconstru…
Text © Al-Hadath (Ramallah) — archived here with attribution to the source. — Machine translation for archival reference. — Original source