Media coverage
MAS Institute · 2026-08-19
The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) discussed a background paper comparing 14 recovery and reconstruction plans for the Gaza Strip and examining possible political scenarios for the “day after.” The discussion concluded that the differences among the plans are not merely technical but center on governance, sovereignty, and ownership of the reconstruction process, stressing the need for a unified Palestinian reference to lead planning and link early recovery with reconstruction.
The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) discussed a background paper comparing 14 recovery and reconstruction plans for the Gaza Strip and examining possible political scenarios for the “day after.” The discussion concluded that the differences among the plans are not merely technica…
Wednesday, 19 August 2026
The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) held its sixth roundtable meeting for 2026 to discuss “The Gaza Strip after the war: visions and comparative analysis of recovery, reconstruction plans, and political scenarios,” at the Institute’s headquarters and via Zoom. The background paper was prepared by the Institute’s researcher Mr. Maseef Maseef, while Dr. Omar Shaban, founder and director of PalThink for Strategic Studies – Gaza Strip, Ms. Yara Salem, coordinator of the technical team for the Gaza Phoenix Framework, and researcher Yasser Shalabi presented their interventions on the paper. In his opening remarks, the Institute’s Director General welcomed the participants, expressing his appreciation to the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Palestine and Jordan Office) for supporting this session.
For his part, Maseef reviewed the structure of the paper, which consists of four main sections. The first section provides a comprehensive and detailed description of the general context in which these plans emerged, classifying them by time period into three groups: plans issued before the latest war, plans issued during the war, and plans issued after the so-called “ceasefire agreement” on 10 October 2025, in addition to classifying them according to the entities that prepared them (international, regional, Palestinian, and private sector). The second section presents a comprehensive analytical matrix comparing the fourteen plans according to the criteria mentioned above. The third section reviews the relevant international legal framework for reconstruction, including international humanitarian law, the right to self-determination, and accountability for grave violations of international law. The report concludes with final observations summarizing the most prominent possible scenarios and outcomes.
The researcher explained that the fundamental disagreement among these plans lies not only in technical aspects, but, at its core, in issues related to governance and sovereignty. From this stem the substantive differences among them, which revolve around a set of main questions, such as: Who determines priorities? Who controls implementation? Who owns the assets that are rebuilt? And will the reconstruction process strengthen Palestinian sovereignty, rights, and national ownership, or will it undermine them? The researcher believes that the fourteen plans can be classified into five main patterns: the technical-developmental approach, the political-security approach, the investment-privatization approach, the international transitional governance approach, and the participatory community-based approach.
The researcher also reviewed a set of general scenarios for reconstruction pathways, based on linking the conclusions of the previous comparison with the likely political reality in the “day after” phase. He summarized the most prominent possible policy paths in four scenarios: Palestinian leadership under a regional/international umbrella; short-term international transitional governance; investment-led reconstruction driven by the private sector with special security arrangements; and continuation of the status quo with fragmented and slow recovery under continuing restrictions. The first scenario makes it possible to strengthen legitimacy and accountability locally and increases the chances of building local content in implementation, although one of its potential risks is the politicization or delay of funding. The second may provide greater speed in funding and implementation, but it could lead to the risk of marginalizing the Palestinian role. The investment scenario focuses on major projects and partnerships with the private sector, but it raises risks related to social justice, property rights, and long-term dependency. By contrast, the continuation of restrictions and tension slows reconstruction and turns it into scattered interventions, thereby prolonging recovery and increasing social and economic risks. These scenarios confirm that the success of any plan depends not only on the quality of its design, but also on the extent of its alignment with the political and security reality and its ability to operate under potential risks and constraints.
The researcher concluded his presentation with a package of recommendations centered on the need to reorient recovery and reconstruction plans toward a clear Palestinian reference grounded in national sovereignty and international law, while adopting unified standards for evaluating plans and distinguishing between forward-looking visions and implementation programs, and ensuring the protection of property and housing, reparation for harm, and the prevention of displacement. Reconstruction plans should also be comprehensive, covering housing, infrastructure, the economy, health, education, social protection, governance, the environment, and community development, while strengthening local participation and the Palestinian private sector. To accelerate implementation, the researcher proposes removing the restrictions that impede reconstruction, achieving national consensus and unifying the political vision, and mobilizing international financial and political support commensurate with the scale of the destruction, alongside activating the role of local bodies, civil society, and the local economy, and ensuring that Palestinians are actors and partners in the reconstruction process, not merely beneficiaries. The importance of coordinating the efforts of international institutions within a unified track also stands out, in a way that reduces fragmentation and enhances the efficiency of funding and implementation and the sustainability of the recovery and reconstruction process.
In her intervention, Yara Salem stressed that the essence of the differences among reconstruction plans is not so much technical as it is political, noting that the paper compares 14 plans and poses a fundamental question about who owns the reconstruction process in Gaza, emphasizing the need for Palestinian ownership of the reconstruction process. She stressed the importance of giving municipalities special attention, given their pivotal role in managing the reconstruction process and delivering services. She also stressed that Gaza is not empty land, and that destruction does not erase memory or property rights. She noted that reconstruction is an interconnected process that goes beyond rebuilding homes and infrastructure. She called for work to restore the Palestinian community’s ability to rebuild itself and strengthen its resilience, and to integrate early recovery plans with reconstruction plans within an integrated vision, affirming at the conclusion of her intervention the importance of cooperation and the exchange of efforts to strengthen and develop the research paper.
In his intervention, Omar Shaban pointed out that international interest in reconstruction has declined amid the continuation of the war and daily bombardment, noting that some reconstruction plans were prepared without any Palestinian participation. He stressed that talk of reconstruction cannot be separated from the existing security and political reality, in light of the continuing restrictions on the entry of materials into the Strip and their being subject to Israeli approval. He also raised fundamental questions about who will finance reconstruction, in addition to how the priorities of donor states and entities will be determined in light of their other crises and priorities. He stressed the scale of the suffering experienced by the residents of the Gaza Strip as a result of the continued killings, and the need to unite Palestinians in the face of a catastrophe that affects everyone, pointing to the settler terrorism taking place in the West Bank.
For his part, researcher Yasser Shalabi explained that the Palestinian government had prepared a plan for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, which had been provided to the Egyptian side and adopted by the League of Arab States, noting that there is also an early recovery plan. He stressed that national ownership of the planning process represents a fundamental element, and that planning for reconstruction should not be limited to the technical aspect, but must be based on a clear political framework in which technical considerations are reflected. He underscored the need for any regional or international efforts to be coordinated with the Palestinian side, affirming that the official Palestinian track is the track that should lead the planning and reconstruction process.
The participants agreed that early recovery constitutes the foundation for any process of reconstructing the Gaza Strip, and that there must be a unified national reference framework on which the various planning and reconstruction efforts can be based. They also affirmed that the success of any plan remains linked to determining the form of government and governance in the Strip. They further stressed that the Palestinian plan must be the primary reference for any regional or international reconstruction efforts, in a way that ensures their alignment with national priorities and needs.
Text © MAS Institute — archived here with attribution to the source. — Machine translation for archival reference. — Original source