Publication
Omar Shaban Ismail · IEMed · 2026
An analytical essay by Omar Shaban in IEMed's Mediterranean Yearbook 2026 tracing the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza from its inauguration in Cairo in January 2026 under the Board of Peace. He argues that discarding the factions' earlier formula of a committee answering to the Palestinian Authority was a consequential political act, and that the US-Israeli war on Iran, launched nine days after the Board of Peace summit, froze the committee's entry into Gaza and stalled donor money. He concludes that the NCAG needs time not controlled by outside actors, decisions that reflect Palestinian agency, and a political horizon beyond its 2027 mandate.
Omar Shaban in IEMed's Mediterranean Yearbook 2026 on Gaza's technocratic committee, the Board of Peace and how the Iran war froze it.
## Context and Origins: How the NCAG Came to Be
The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) is a transitional body mandated by the United Nations to manage day-to-day operations of civil service and administration in the Gaza Strip following the 2023–2025 war. Formally inaugurated on 16 January 2026 in Cairo, it is composed of independent Palestinian technocrats and operates under the supervision of the Board of Peace (BoP), chaired by US President Donald Trump.
The NCAG’s origins reveal a crucial founding tension. Palestinian factions had previously agreed — during Cairo talks in October 2024 — that any transitional committee should be established by a presidential decree from Mahmoud Abbas and report to the Palestinian Authority. That vision was discarded in favour of the US-Israeli preference: a technocratic body answering to neither Hamas nor the PA, but to the externally designed Board of Peace. The ECFR notes that the NCAG “was first envisaged as a Community Support Committee which Palestinian factions agreed to establish under the PA’s auspices.” The departure from this framework was itself a political act of considerable consequence.
The NCAG is one of four governance structures in the transitional framework, alongside the Board of Peace, the Gaza Executive Board, and an International Stabilization Force. The Board of Peace formally launched in January 2026, with Mladenov — a former UN Middle East envoy and former Bulgarian defence minister — appointed as its High Representative for Gaza.
TABLE 1 The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza
## The Board of Peace Summit — 19 February 2026: Promises and Their Limits
The inaugural Board of Peace summit in Washington on 19 February was the defining diplomatic moment for the NCAG’s operational launch. Attended by representatives from over 40 countries — including several heads of state — the summit produced concrete pledges but also exposed the gap between diplomatic ambition and ground-level reality. That gap would widen dramatically just nine days later.
USD 10 billion pledged for Gaza reconstruction, primarily from Gulf nations, though analysts have since noted that only approximately $7 billion has materialized in NCAG-accessible funds.
Five countries committed troops to the International Stabilization Force, projected to comprise approximately 20,000 soldiers across five brigades covering Rafah, Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah, Gaza City, and Northern Gaza, with 26 watchtowers and a 350-acre military base.
Plans to recruit approximately 12,000 police officers to re-establish internal security under a unified command, with Egypt designated as the lead training partner. Some 1,000 applicants registered in the first hours of the recruitment process.
Shaath presented the committee’s “first 100-day” plan, covering emergency relief, water rehabilitation, medical supply chains and housing provision.
Trump declared the Board “a turning point toward stability.” He stated he saw no need for military action against Hamas given the group’s commitment to disarm — a statement that would appear ironic within days given US strikes on Iran.
Shaath’s own remarks at the summit were notably sober. He reminded attendees that conditions on the ground were “extremely difficult,” that “large parts of Gaza are severely damaged and destroyed,” and that “law and order remain fragile.” The gap between his framing and the triumphalist tone of the summit hosts encapsulated the fundamental tension defining the entire enterprise. That tension would be sharpened, not resolved, by subsequent events.
The Nine-Day Window: From Summit to War
The Board of Peace summit concluded on 19 February. On 28 February — nine days later — the United States and Israel launched surprise airstrikes on multiple sites across Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior Iranian military officials. This transformed the regional and geopolitical context in which the NCAG operates from one of post-ceasefire governance-building to one of active regional war. The summit’s pledges, its timelines and its institutional momentum did not simply slow — they entered a fundamentally different strategic environment.
The Iran-US-Israel Ceasefire: Partial De-escalation (7–8 April 2026)
After 39 days of strikes and counterstrikes, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week conditional ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, announced on 7–8 April 2026. Iran agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz during the truce period, easing a disruption that had sent global energy markets into turmoil. Trump declared a “total and complete victory.” The ceasefire was immediately contested: Israel maintained it did not include Lebanon and launched a significant wave of strikes there hours after the announcement. Lebanon and Israel subsequently agreed to a separate 10-day ceasefire on 16 April, extended to three weeks on 23 April. On 21 April, Trump extended the Iran truce pending further negotiations. (Al-Jazeera, 8 April 2026) | CNN, 7 April 2026
The ceasefire does not restore the pre-war diplomatic environment on which the NCAG’s operational timeline was premised: the Rafah Crossing remains partially restricted; donor disbursement mechanisms remain disrupted; and international diplomatic attention, while partially returning to Gaza, has not regained the momentum of the 19 February summit. Mladenov called for the Rafah Crossing to be fully reopened and noted that since late March, daily entry into Gaza was being gradually increased from a cap of approximately 50 people per day — still way below the level required to meet humanitarian needs. The ceasefire represents de-escalation, not restoration.
## The US-Israel War on Iran (28 February Onward): The Variable No One Modelled
When this analysis was originally drafted, the prospect of a full-scale US-Israeli war on Iran was not a seriously modelled scenario. That is itself analytically significant: the entire architecture of the NCAG, the Board of Peace and the Gaza ceasefire framework was constructed on the assumption of a contained regional order in which the ceasefire would hold, donors would disburse, and the committee would gradually assume governance. That assumption no longer holds.
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated surprise airstrikes targeting multiple Iranian sites in at least 26 of Iran’s 31 provinces, killing Supreme Leader Khamenei and dozens of senior military commanders. Iran retaliated with missile and drone strikes against Israel, US military bases and allied countries across the region. By day ten of the conflict, Iran had fired over 300 missiles at Israel — though Iranian missile capacity degraded sharply due to sustained US-Israeli suppression efforts. Israel simultaneously launched a ground incursion into southern Lebanon on 3 March, claiming to establish a “security layer.” The Houthis, restrained by prior US airstrikes on their leadership, confined themselves largely to rhetorical solidarity rather than direct military action.
Direct Consequences for Gaza
The impact on Gaza has been immediate, severe and multi-dimensional. Al-Jazeera’s ground reporting from 9 March captures the cascading effect: as soon as US-Israeli strikes hit Iran on 28 February, concerns surged in Gaza over how the latest conflict would affect a population already subjected to two years of genocidal war.
Israel closed all Gaza crossings, specifically interrupting free circulation at the Egypt-Gaza border, using the Iranian conflict and the declared state of emergency as justification.
Israeli forces suspended United Nations humanitarian movements and postponed planned rotations of international humanitarian staff, including medical evacuations and the return of people into Gaza.
The NCAG’s already-stalled entry into Gaza was further frozen, with no timeline established and no diplomatic momentum available to press for it.
Donor mechanisms for reconstruction financing have stalled. The $10 billion pledged at the 19 February summit, already underdisbursed at approximately $7 billion, faces further delays as Gulf donors and European governments redirect political attention and logistical capacity to the broader regional crisis.
Israeli violations of the October ceasefire have intensified. According to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, Israeli attacks since the ceasefire began have killed at least 648 Palestinians and wounded nearly 18,000. Al-Jazeera reports that Israel continues to bombard Gaza on a daily basis, violating the 10 October ceasefire agreement.
Analysts at ACLED note that the shift in international attention has given Israel significantly greater operational space to carry out military actions in Gaza without triggering major international reactions.
“Israel continues to carry out what he described as ‘systematic acts of genocide’ in Gaza, exploiting every opportunity to deepen conditions that make life increasingly impossible for an exhausted population.” — Ramy Abdu, head of the Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, quoted by Al-Jazeera, March 2026.
Strategic Implications for the NCAG
The Iran war has transformed the NCAG’s structural position in three ways that compound each other.
First: The diplomatic bandwidth that made the 19 February summit possible — American political capital, Gulf state engagement, European institutional attention — has been almost entirely redirected. There is no credible international actor currently applying meaningful pressure on Israel to allow the NCAG entry into Gaza.
Second: The financial architecture is broken. Reconstruction pledges were conditioned on a stable ceasefire environment and functional donor mechanisms. The regional war has disrupted both. A Gaza analyst cited by al-Jazeera observes that “only a fraction” of pledged funds has materialized in NCAG-accessible channels.
External geopolitical dynamics determine Palestinian realities more decisively than any internal governance arrangement
Third: The NCAG’s operational mandate — civilian administration, service restoration — presupposes a minimum of stability and access. Neither currently exists. The committee risks being a governance body in name while Gaza continues to be administered, in practice, by a combination of Israeli military control and Hamas security presence, with neither accountable to Gazan civilians.
The Iran war has also, paradoxically, strengthened one argument that had previously been used against the NCAG: that external geopolitical dynamics determine Palestinian realities more decisively than any internal governance arrangement. The committee was designed to operate in a world where the US was focused on Gaza. That world no longer exists, at least temporarily.
## Structural Challenges and Systemic Risks
The Israeli Blockade: An Unresolved First Test
On 20 January 2026, just days after the NCAG’s inauguration, Israel blocked committee members from entering Gaza without providing a clear public rationale. As of early February, an unnamed Arab diplomat told The Times of Israel there was “no longer any timeline” for the NCAG’s entry, citing the committee not being “equipped to govern” and a lack of an “appropriate environment.” The outbreak of the Iran war on 28 February has made that environment significantly worse rather than better.
Haaretz, citing Palestinian and Arab officials, reported that both the PA and Hamas — despite their public endorsements — were quietly seeking to limit the committee’s effectiveness for self-interested reasons, and that the technocrats themselves feared targeting by Israeli-backed local armed groups. With the Iran war providing cover for Israel’s continued military operations in Gaza, the committee’s physical entry remains the single most concrete measure of whether this governance framework is real or performative.
Governance Without Authority: The Core Paradox
The IPI Global Observatory’s analysis remains the most precise structural critique of the NCAG’s design. Its assessment, published before the Iran war, has been validated rather than superseded by subsequent events:
“The NCAG’s mandate excludes control over borders, security arrangements, reconstruction financing and political timelines. It does not regulate movement, negotiate security frameworks, or control the disbursement of funding. It administers services within parameters defined elsewhere. Administration without authority is not governance. When a technocratic body is denied access and lacks decision-making power, it cannot function as a political authority. Instead, it risks becoming a symbolic institution that absorbs expectations and public frustration without possessing the capacity to alter underlying conditions.”
The IPI also warns of what it terms the “successful failure” scenario: the NCAG “succeeds administratively while reproducing a modified version of the status quo ante under a technocratic framework — marking not a transition but continuity under a different name.” This risk has intensified under conditions of regional war.
The Security Dimension: Hamas, the Yellow Line and the New Disarmament Plan
A critical design contradiction persists: the NCAG’s mission statement speaks of “establishing security control” as a core mandate, but the committee’s powers are limited exclusively to civilian affairs. Hamas retains de facto security control over Gaza. This was clarified after a 26 January meeting between Shaath and BoP member Tony Blair: the NCAG will play no role in the disarmament of armed groups.
Yet disarmament has now returned to the centre of the governance conversation — not through the NCAG, but through a separate and more coercive process being driven by Mladenov and the Board of Peace, discussed in detail in Section 6 below. Hamas, meanwhile, has reinforced its presence along the Yellow Line, signalling that it alone can provide the committee with the security coordination it needs to operate. The committee is operationally dependent on the very organization it was designed to replace.
The Legitimacy Deficit
The House of Commons Library briefing notes that while both Hamas and the PA have endorsed the committee, “many Palestinians remain sceptical of the NCAG’s autonomy.” The IPI articulates the structural dimension of this skepticism: the NCAG was “formed through agreement among the major Palestinian factions in Cairo, but its structure and scope have not been ratified by the Palestinian Authority’s formal institutional apparatus, such as a presidential decree or legislative mandate. As a result, it risks operating without clear, uncontested consent.”
A Gaza-based writer published in The New Humanitarian frames the problem with particular precision:
“Expertise is not legitimacy. Legitimacy comes from accountability. Shaath’s authority is not derived from elections, popular consultation, or a transparent process rooted in Gaza’s public life. It is derived from appointment within an externally designed framework. Gaza, after two years of devastation and amid continued external control, has no meaningful mechanism for conferring consent on a transitional committee installed from above.”
## The Mladenov Disarmament Plan and the UN Security Council Speech (25 March 2026)
On 25 March 2026, Nickolay Mladenov addressed the UN Security Council at its monthly session on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, speaking as High Representative of the Board of Peace and liaison to the NCAG. His address — and the detailed disarmament proposal that accompanied it — represent the most significant institutional development for the NCAG since the 19 February summit, and one that fundamentally alters the committee’s position and mandate.
The Speech: Key Positions
Mladenov told Security Council members that only “verified decommissioning combined with a new professional police force and a civilian administration eliminates the threat permanently.” He argued that “the evidence of the last 20 years debunks arguments that long-term Israeli military control of the enclave is necessary,” and called demilitarization “the only pathway that provides Israel with durable security.”
On the NCAG specifically, Mladenov confirmed that the committee had begun “vetting thousands of civilian police candidates,” with Egypt confirmed as the lead training partner for the 12,000-officer force. He linked reconstruction explicitly to disarmament:
“The people of Gaza want reconstruction, and reconstruction requires the decommissioning of weapons.” — Mladenov, UN Security Council, 25 March 2026.
He called on Security Council members to “use all means at their disposal to urge Hamas and all Palestinian factions to accept this framework without delay,” and warned: “If this process fails, the consequences will be devastating — a divided Gaza and the loss of any credible pathway to Palestinian statehood.” On the Rafah Crossing, Mladenov called for it to remain open following Israel’s closure during the Iran war, and revealed that starting the following day, the number of people permitted to enter Gaza would gradually increase from the current cap of approximately 50 per day.
The Disarmament Plan: Structure and Phases
Details of the formal disarmament document submitted to armed groups — obtained by al-Jazeera — reveal an eight-month, multiphase framework built on a step-by-step formula. The plan was presented to relevant parties during Cairo meetings in mid-March 2026.
Phase 1 (First Two Weeks): Stabilization and Entry
Complete cessation of military operations by both Israel and Hamas.
Implementation of all humanitarian protocols committed to under the October ceasefire.
NCAG representatives allowed into Gaza to assume all security and administrative responsibilities.
Phase 2 (Days 16–60): Initial Disarmament
Hamas and other Palestinian factions begin removing heavy weapons, initially from areas under Israeli military control, then from Hamas-controlled areas before day 90.
Israel begins staged withdrawal from Yellow Line positions in parallel.
Reconstruction materials begin entering Gaza contingent on compliance verification.
Phase 3 (Days 61–240): Full Decommissioning and Reintegration
Complete decommissioning of all weapons including personal firearms.
Structured amnesty arrangements and reintegration programmes for individuals affiliated with armed groups, allowing “re-entry into civilian life with dignity.”
Verification by international monitors throughout the process.
Reconstruction benchmarks linked to compliance milestones.
Times of Israel reports that two senior Arab officials familiar with the proposal expect Hamas to respond with a counter-offer within days. Hamas and Israel have not yet officially reacted publicly to the plan’s specific details.
Critical Analysis of the Disarmament Plan
Palestinian analysts and factions view the Mladenov plan with deep scepticism, and their objections have analytical substance. Gaza political analyst Wissam Afifa, quoted by al-Jazeera, describes the document as more of a “threat message” than a negotiating initiative.
One-sided conditions: Despite Mladenov’s invocation of “reciprocity,” the plan’s practical weight falls almost entirely on Palestinian disarmament. Hamas has consistently insisted that the first phase of the October ceasefire — which requires Israeli military withdrawal and unconditional aid entry — must be implemented before weapons are addressed. Neither condition has been fulfilled.
Mandate creep on the NCAG: Afifa warns that confirming the NCAG is now vetting police candidates represents an attempt to saddle the committee with a security enforcement role before the humanitarian crisis is addressed, effectively “turning it into an enforcement tool rather than a purely civilian administration.” This is significant: it means the NCAG’s character is being redefined by external actors without any formal revision of its mandate.
Context of regional war: The disarmament plan was presented to Hamas during a period when Israel was conducting a regional war with Iran, closing Gaza crossings, and killing Palestinians inside the Strip in ceasefire violations. Asking Hamas to disarm under these conditions, without any demonstrated Israeli good faith, is widely seen as politically untenable.
The committee that was designed to transcend factional politics has been drawn into the most politically charged issue in Palestinian political life
The surrender framing: Palestinian experts previously told al-Jazeera that the plan, in effect, means the “political surrender” of Hamas. Hamas has stated that disarmament is an internal Palestinian matter to be discussed between factions, not imposed from outside.
The disarmament plan, whatever its eventual outcome, has already produced one concrete consequence for the NCAG: by linking reconstruction to weapons decommissioning and confirming that the committee is now vetting police, the plan has blurred the boundary between the NCAG’s “apolitical civilian” character and the explicitly political project of disarming Hamas. The committee that was designed to transcend factional politics has been drawn into the most politically charged issue in Palestinian political life.
April Ultimatums and the Collapse of Momentum
The disarmament question escalated sharply through April in a sequence that exposed the limits of the Board of Peace’s coercive strategy. On 7 April, the Board of Peace gave Hamas until the end of that week to accept the disarmament proposal, with the deadline conveyed by Mladenov directly at a Cairo meeting with senior Hamas officials. On 7 April 2026, The Times of Israel reported that the deadline was conveyed after “the group dragged its feet in responding to the proposal it first received nearly four weeks ago.” Hamas did not comply.
On 14 April, Haaretz (Liza Rozovsky and Jack Khoury, 14 April 2026) reported that Mladenov met for a second time with Hamas’s chief negotiator in Cairo, with a new Tuesday deadline set — and again no breakthroughs were made. Hamas officials told Haaretz that “without guarantees that Israel implements phase one of the cease-fire plan, disarmament is not on the table.” The Haaretz report also revealed that Mladenov met Hamas’s chief negotiator to discuss specifically Phase 2 of Trump’s Gaza plan, but sources confirmed no progress was achieved. A diplomatic source told the paper that Hamas was insisting on ironclad guarantees before any further movement.
On 21 April, The Jewish Chronicle reported that Mladenov confirmed to Reuters that talks had “effectively stalled.” He told Reuters: “We’ve had some very serious discussions with Hamas over the last few weeks. They’re not easy.” He nonetheless described himself as “fairly optimistic,” adding: “We have a matter of days, maximum a couple of weeks… because otherwise we will lose the momentum of what we have, and then every decision will become even more difficult.”
A tactically significant development emerged from Hamas’s counter-position: the group told mediators it was prepared to hand over weapons — but only to the NCAG itself, not to Israel or to any international body. This is analytically important for the committee’s institutional trajectory. Hamas may be prepared, under pressure, to grant the NCAG a security role it was never formally given — as a way of blocking a more direct Israeli or American role in overseeing disarmament. Whether the NCAG actually has the capacity or the political mandate to enforce any such arrangement remains, in the words of The Jewish Chronicle, “not clear.”
A separate but related issue concerns Hamas’s 40,000-plus civil servants. Hamas urged them in writing to cooperate with the NCAG, assuring them it was working to incorporate them into the new government structure. Hamas specifically sought incorporation of its approximately 10,000-strong police force into the new NCAG-supervised…
Topic: Gaza Governance — NCAG · Board of Peace · Iran war · transitional administration — Text © IEMed — archived here with attribution to the source. — Original source