Omar Shaban's assessment that the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), for all its flaws, is the most realistic option available — and what it needs to become a governing body rather than a symbolic one: entry into Gaza, real capacity, money, and a link to Palestinian democratic institutions before its mandate ends in December 2027.
Omar Shaban on Gaza's administration committee (NCAG): the most realistic option, and what it needs to govern — entry, capacity, funds, legitimacy.
Inaugurated in Cairo on 16 January 2026 under the Board of Peace and UN Security Council Resolution 2803, the NCAG is a committee of independent Palestinian technocrats. Israel has kept it out of Gaza; the Palestinian Authority sees it as a potential competitor; Hamas authorities inside Gaza have consolidated their control; and pledged reconstruction funds have largely not reached it. Its mandate excludes borders, security, reconstruction financing and political timelines, and its structure was never ratified by a presidential decree or legislative mandate. Meanwhile Deir al-Balah held Gaza's first local election in two decades on 25 April 2026 — without the committee.
Despite political resistance and operational constraints, the NCAG “remains the most realistic and immediately available option on the table. For this reason, every effort should be made to ensure its success.” Yet a committee that cannot enter, cannot disburse and cannot protect is not yet a functioning governance body.
Recommendations
Press for the committee's immediate entry into Gaza; without physical presence no governance is possible.
Empower the committee sufficiently — with access, capacity and funding — to address the far-reaching consequences of two years of war.
Coordinate with the Palestinian Authority and the Central Elections Commission so that the committee becomes a bridge between the external framework and Palestinian democratic institutions.
Partner with the elected Deir al-Balah council on water, electricity and local services.
In the disarmament negotiations, act as a facilitating institution with an interest in genuinely reciprocal conditions, not as an enforcer.
Use the period until December 2027 to build civil registries, municipal bodies, professional cadres and accountability mechanisms, working with diaspora professionals and UN agencies and preparing policies for rapid deployment on entry.
Preserve the cross-factional support the committee enjoys and develop the partnership with Egypt.
Expected outcomes
A municipal partnership with Deir al-Balah that is both democratically sourced and operationally grounded.
Institutions — registries, municipal bodies, cadres, accountability mechanisms — that will outlast the external mandate structure.
A form of Palestinian political credibility, through cross-factional support, that the PA in the West Bank has consistently failed to sustain.