Publication
Omar Shaban Ismail · PalThink for Strategic Studies · 2018
An Arabic research paper analysing how the Fatah–Hamas split since 2007 weakened Palestinian civil society institutions, distorted their roles, and outlining proposals to restore national unity and civil-society effectiveness.
An Arabic research paper analysing how the Fatah–Hamas split since 2007 weakened Palestinian civil society institutions, distorted their roles, and…
Ramifications of Internal Division on Palestinian Civil Society Work and Proposals for Addressing Them
Omar Shaban
The Palestinian situation entered a qualitative turning point following the events of internal division, after nearly a year of internecine fighting in the Gaza Strip between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in mid-June 2007. This produced a split in the political system and the Palestinian Authority, as the Authority's control retreated to the West Bank areas only, while the Gaza Strip came under Hamas control. The fighting and division that ensued rolled back most of the gains and achievements of previous stages at the political level, within the national program, and in building modern Palestinian state institutions. There was also a decline in the level of public rights and freedoms, followed by a weakening and marginalization of the role of Palestinian civil society institutions in general. Likewise, there was a sharp decline in the level of Arab and international support for the Palestinian cause.
This paper reviews the ramifications of the division on the Palestinian civil society sector and the attempts of Palestinian civil society to confront these ramifications and the efforts it has made to end the division and achieve national unity. The paper also addresses the functional nature of the role of these institutions during the years of division, and the initiatives put forward to end the division and achieve Palestinian national reconciliation. It presents the shortcomings in the role of these institutions, in addition to the challenges that prevented civil society institutions from playing an active and pressure-bearing role to influence the divided Palestinian parties (Fatah and Hamas) to end the division and achieve national reconciliation.
Introduction
Studying the role of Palestinian civil society institutions in ending the division and working to achieve reconciliation requires not overlooking the fact that these institutions are not a neutral party or outside the circle of division and its dynamics. Many of these institutions can be classified and regarded as an instrument and a party to this division and part of it, given their ideological and political affiliations. Nevertheless, it can be said that most of them became aware of the dangers of division and its ramifications, which was embodied in their continuous attempts to provide the minimum requirements for achieving national reconciliation. Palestinian civil society differs in its composition and functions from the nature and form of civil society in other independent states. Palestinian civil society began to take shape under the Ottoman associations law before developing within the institutional structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization after its establishment in the mid-1960s. Palestinian civil society went beyond its traditional role of meeting societal or demand-driven needs only; its primary role extended to carrying out national political tasks and confronting the policies and practices of the British Mandate at first and later the Israeli occupation, given the absence of a Palestinian political system since the early twentieth century. Civil society in Palestine was required to perform the role of a state that did not exist.
Civil society institutions are a fundamental and very important component of the makeup of any state, given their developmental and supportive role in strengthening efforts to achieve community development and social solidarity. Palestinian civil society institutions represent part of the civic life of Palestinian society that has accompanied it throughout the journey of national formation. They are a channel for mobilization and a lever for building Palestinian society and reviving the elements of its survival and development. In addition, concepts of tolerance, acceptance of the other, reconciliation, democratic integration, forgiveness, and the national interest are convictions for which these institutions struggle and which they seek to strengthen in the value system of their communities. Hence, the main problem of this paper lies in the following question: To what extent does the role of Palestinian civil society institutions contribute to ending the division and achieving national reconciliation?
Palestinian Civil Society: Specificity of Formation
Civil society has a history linked to politics, economics, and ideas, and to the development of the emergence of the concepts of society and the state. This society is a historical and conceptual outcome on the path toward citizenship and democracy. When considering the concept of civil society in terms of its content and uses across different historical stages, we find that in the Palestinian context and case it has been distinguished by special features within the framework of the formation of its institutions and their functions. At the level of formation, the emergence and development of civil society institutions in Palestine was linked to the absence of a legitimate national authority and to conditions of occupation, repression, and colonialism since the early twentieth century, as well as to the deliberate erasure of the national and civilizational identity of the Palestinian people. With the continuation and escalation of conditions of suppression and persecution, institutions developed to carry out tasks and responsibilities that are at the core of the responsibilities of authority and are not complementary to it, as is the case in other independent states. The work of Palestinian civil society institutions, especially voluntary organizations, focused on confronting the authority of occupation, working to form frameworks of self-protection for the Palestinian people, strengthening their national presence, preserving their political and social identity as a cohesive whole, and maintaining the fabric of their society as a national necessity, in addition to performing social and service functions. Patterns of Palestinian societal institutions are classified into two types:
The first type: political forces and parties.
The second type: voluntary organizations, which are divided according to their nature into:
Charitable associations and cooperatives.
Mass organizations.
Developmental institutions and organizations.
Research, media, and human rights centers and institutions.
Institutions and bodies defending the rights and interests of specific groups.
Palestinian Civil Society After the Establishment of the Palestinian Authority
The number of non-governmental organizations in the Palestinian territories, according to statistics of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, reached 3,600 organizations. These organizations are distributed as 2,800 organizations in the West Bank and 800 in the Gaza Strip. Approximately 60% of these organizations were established after the emergence of the Palestinian Authority, and most of them are concentrated in urban areas. The establishment of the Palestinian Authority represented an important development in the journey of Palestinian civil society and its institutions in two respects:
First: the noticeable increase in the number of these institutions, their qualitative development, and the expansion of their spread in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Second: the growth of the role of institutions, as the presence of the Palestinian Authority and its management of internal Palestinian affairs pushed these institutions to participate in the development tasks required by the phase of self-rule in various fields, and to work on developing the structure of Palestinian society and strengthening and entrenching values of civic loyalty. In addition, they confronted the abuses of the Authority's agencies and the violations it practiced at times. Despite carrying out these roles and tasks, they faced many subjective and objective obstacles that limited their ability to play an active and influential role allowing them to participate positively in directing relations and interactions within the political and social fields and in strengthening the process of democratic transition. The following are the most prominent of these obstacles:
Obstacles Faced by Civil Society Institutions:
1. The increasing politicization of many Palestinian civil society institutions.
2. Their lack of independence within the framework of their relationship with the authority, which seeks to dominate them and intervene in their activities. Here, civil society institutions can be divided on the basis of the criterion of politicization into independent and neutral institutions; party-affiliated and indirectly politicized institutions that nevertheless operate within the national framework; and party-affiliated and directly politicized institutions that operate according to a party agenda.
3. The limited financial and economic resources and the instability of funding sources.
4. The spread of a set of negative phenomena in a large number of them, such as personalization, administrative and financial corruption, and the absence of effective systems of oversight and accountability.
These and other obstacles greatly affected the performance and nature of the work of Palestinian civil society institutions, which was reflected in their positions and standing. The role of civil society weakened with the decline of the general Palestinian political situation, especially during the years of division. Under the division over political authority, these organizations were no longer able to redefine themselves socially. They were exposed to practices of domination, exclusion, and restriction on the one hand, while on the other hand they were largely absorbed within the structure of knowledge and practice in the framework of external aid strategies. The ramifications of the political division witnessed in the Palestinian territories were not limited to the space of the Palestinian political field; they extended to affect all political, social, and economic structures and frameworks, drawing them into the squares of division and its details.
Civil society institutions were severely affected by the ramifications and outcomes of political division and by its consequences for freedoms and the restriction of civil society work. Developmental agendas were transformed to mirror the reality of division. This led to a divergence in the agendas of many of those organizations geographically in mirroring the Palestinian reality. Regionalism dominated the performance of these organizations intensely, to the point that civil society in Palestine came to discuss divergent and different issues according to geographic area. At a time when civil society institutions in the Gaza Strip were addressing the blockade and repeated Israeli aggressions against the Strip and the closure of crossings, institutions in the West Bank were addressing settlement, the wall, and land confiscation. Meanwhile, in Jerusalem, issues related to identity revocation, house demolitions, and the Judaization of the city were the focus of institutions there. Accordingly, the unified national agenda disappeared or retreated under these policies to suit the areas in which they operate.
Palestinian Civil Society and the State of Division
The division in June 2007 completed a state of collapse that had begun since the early 1990s, which carried seeds from the stage that preceded it—the stage of the PLO's leadership of national struggle from abroad—including Israel's deliberate attempts to deepen division and push the entire situation toward the endpoint it reached. These matters combined led to the erosion of the foundations and conditions of development and the near-total disappearance of strengthening the public sphere represented in civil society. Palestinian division in June 2007 passed through three main stages:
The intensification of bipolar polarization between Fatah and Hamas following the second legislative elections in 2006 under a unified authority and the struggle over powers and dual control.
The transition of polarization and conflict from the political framework to the arena of internal fighting and militarization.
The resolution of the conflict by force and arms, which led to dual control and a duality of authority.
These stages raise a question about the extent to which civil society institutions contributed to strengthening and entrenching a set of values and principles such as tolerance, dialogue, integration, national and societal loyalty, social peace, and a culture of negotiation in resolving disputes instead of the language of force, so as to prevent the aggravation of the state of division amid all the obstacles they face.
Changes in the Role and Performance of Civil Society Institutions
Some variables emerged in the performance of institutions after civil society was subjected to a series of measures, decisions, and laws in both Gaza and the West Bank aimed at limiting its independence and attempting to intervene in its affairs, including:
The shrinking of their role in defending public freedoms and democratic issues, which pushed them to preserve themselves in the face of the weight of the new measures.
The curtailment of organizations with democratic and secular orientations, and in contrast the emergence and spread of new organizations close in nature to the ruling political party in each of Gaza and the West Bank. In Gaza, many organizations affiliated with or close to Hamas emerged; in the West Bank, many organizations affiliated with or close to Fatah emerged. In contrast, many organizations linked to the competing political party in each of the two areas were curtailed and closed.
The drift of civil society elites toward adapting to the requirements of the existing authority while preserving the independence, survival, and continuity of the work of voluntary organizations. Confrontation with the authority became weak and soft in a manner that took diplomatic considerations into account in the critical discourse toward the authority and avoided clashing with it.
The retreat of developmental work in favor of relief work due to the Israeli blockade imposed on the Strip and the destruction resulting from three consecutive Israeli wars, and the destruction of institutions, associations, and infrastructure. Poverty, unemployment, and societal issues imposed a change in the roles of organizations. Relief work came to dominate the nature and performance of institutions.
The entry of new funding bodies with Islamic orientations (Turkey, Qatar, Indonesia, Malaysia) that focused on supporting organizations with an Islamic orientation at the expense of institutions with a secular or leftist character, and strengthened the provision of assistance or service in connection with party affiliation.
The inability of voluntary organizations to crystallize a national vision and a clear work agenda, which made them respond without resistance to the agendas of international funding.
Civil society institutions came to suffer from a state of divergence in their position and standing regarding the state of division. They can be divided as follows:
Institutions that supported the orientations of the contending political forces and their methods of dealing during the stages of division, especially institutions affiliated with and supportive of these forces, which used many of these institutions as tools of division and the imposition of political domination, in addition to the bias of some of these institutions in their media-political discourse toward one of the parties to the division and working to justify the practices carried out by these parties.
Institutions that were targeted during the division, as their contribution and support for the contending political forces led to their being targeted. This took many forms, such as attacks on those running them, their arrest, the closure of many of them, preventing them from carrying out their activities, and confiscating their contents. These measures sometimes also affected institutions that had no relation to the contending parties, especially institutions that monitor and document the practices of these parties.
Institutions that were not concerned with the issue of division or reconciliation, either because of their fear of intervening in these issues or because of the nature of their activity and the weakness of their capabilities and capacities to deal with the state of division. This was clearly manifested in the reluctance of many Palestinian civil society institutions to participate in events, activities, and initiatives aimed at ending the division and achieving reconciliation, such as institutions working in the field of community development, institutions with a civic-relief character, and many trade union institutions.
Institutions that opposed the arrival of political competition and conflict to the stage of division, and some of which began taking a set of steps within their efforts to achieve national reconciliation by working to bring the views of the contending parties closer and preparing a conducive environment for conducting national dialogue and accomplishing reconciliation. This was embodied in many conferences, discussions, and seminars organized by these institutions with the participation of representatives of various Palestinian factions, in addition to presenting some initiatives that reflected the vision of these institutions regarding the state of division and what it included of a set of proposed mechanisms to contribute to resolving disputes between Fatah and Hamas and achieving national reconciliation.
Civil Society Initiatives to End the Division and Achieve National Unity:
During the fifteen years of division, many limited initiatives by Palestinian civil society institutions emerged as they moved to mediate between Fatah and Hamas and achieve national reconciliation. However, all these attempts lacked the momentum and ability to achieve a breakthrough in the wall of division. The forms of initiatives presented by Palestinian civil society institutions, alongside the initiatives put forward by Palestinian factions, can be classified as follows:
Initiatives to address the state of division.
Initiatives to address the ramifications of the state of division.
Initiatives to pressure for dialogue.
Initiatives to market certain visions.
We mention here some of these initiatives presented by Palestinian civil society to end the division since 2007:
First: Initiatives of the PalThink for Strategic Studies:
Since the beginning of the division events in June 2007, PalThink worked on presenting a set of visions and implementing many initiatives regarding how to end the division and seek to bring the views of Hamas and Fatah closer. It was the pioneer among civil society institutions in working to end the division. In September 2007, it presented an initiative on how to exit the crisis (as shown below—Proposed Framework for a Solution). After that, it became a reference point for other initiatives, which acted as an incentive for institutions to work toward ending the division and achieving societal reconciliation. Despite the absence of mechanisms to activate those initiatives on the ground, with the exception of a small number of institutions—most prominently PalThink for Strategic Studies, which continued to follow up on the initiatives it presented, in addition to presenting a set of proposals to address the ramifications of division on the judicial and governmental apparatus and the social fabric, and presenting visions and solutions for exiting the state of division.
Throughout the years of division, the institution implemented a set of initiatives, conferences, and dialogue meetings to discuss how to work on restoring national unity and achieving reconciliation. These ideas and initiatives came in order to address the obstacles that led to the occurrence of division and Hamas's control of the Gaza Strip. They aimed to address most issues at the economic, political, and social levels. Among the most important of these initiatives:
PalThink Reconciliation Initiative "Proposed Framework for a Solution," 2007:
In September 2007, PalThink issued a policy paper entitled: "Exiting the Palestinian Crisis: A National Necessity That Cannot Be Postponed." This paper was the outcome of many deliberative sessions and brainstorming organized by the institution with a number of representatives of political forces, members of the Legislative Council, academics, and activists within the framework of civil society. This paper is considered a public product in that it is linked to national motives free from narrow party calculations or regional calculations that transcend Palestinian national interests. It is suitable to be transformed into a reference and a tool of pressure on political decision-makers. This paper came with the aim of contributing effectively to launching the process of national reconciliation and beginning dialogue to restore unity to the national project. The paper attempted to include logical and rational answers to the questions posed by reality. It presented ways to exit the internal crisis following the events of June 2007 and PalThink for Strategic Studies' vision of how to exit the crisis from a purely Palestinian perspective.
Community Initiatives to Strengthen Community Unity and National Reconciliation:
These initiatives consisted of cooperation with a number of grassroots institutions in the governorates of Gaza, which presented initiatives to implement activities and events at the community level in partnership with institutions in the governorates of the West Bank. These initiatives came within a project contributing to the role of grassroots voluntary institutions in both parts of the homeland in achieving community unity at the national level. This falls within the Coalition of Voluntary Institutions for Palestinian Reconciliation, which includes a number of voluntary institutions for Palestinian reconciliation.
Dialogue Meetings, PalThink for Strategic Studies in Partnership with the Secretariat of Student Frameworks:
The Secretariat of Student Frameworks in the Gaza Strip, within the framework of cooperation with PalThink, held a series of dialogue meetings with a group of male and female university students. These meetings revolved around the importance of the role of youth in society and how to strengthen their role in political and community participation, in addition to discussing the ramifications of division and the deprivation of youth of their right to participation and elections, and how to activate the role of youth in society and assume an active role in pressuring decision-makers to end the division and achieve national unity.
The Swiss Paper, Roadmap for Integrating Employees:
Prior to the formation of the Palestinian National Consensus Government 2013/2014, PalThink for Strategic Studies, in partnership with the Swiss government, worked for a full year to present a complete plan for a solution. This initiative was unique with regard to the issue of public sector employees. The slogan of the paper was as follows: "Everyone who works must receive a salary, and everyone who receives a salary must work." The paper was built in accordance with the Palestinian Basic Law and the General Personnel Council. It presented the substance of a roadmap for integrating civil employees in the Gaza Strip within a package of criteria that help apply a practical and gradual integration process. It also aimed to contribute to strengthening the consensus government and enhancing reconciliation, and constitutes a significant contribution to achieving a unified and effective structure for civil services in all governorates. The paper included a financial plan over five years for the process of reform, qualification, development, and advancement of the public…
Topic: National Reconciliation — internal division · civil society · NGOs · reconciliation · Gaza Governance · PalThink · Fatah · Hamas — Original source — PDF