Omar Shaban's case for a Gaza seaport as an economic lever and an expression of Palestinian sovereignty: reactivate the Oslo and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements, use a temporary solution under UN and international auspices if needed, and treat the port as an incentive for reconciliation rather than a reward for it.
Omar Shaban's case for a Gaza seaport: reactivate the Oslo agreements, use a UN-backed interim solution, and make the port an incentive for unity.
Gaza exported citrus through its own port before 1967. The Oslo Accords and the 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum provided for a Gaza seaport; construction begun with European funding was bombed during the second Intifada, and the project stalled after the 2007 division and blockade. Since then the proposals have multiplied — a port inside Gaza, maritime lines to Cyprus, El-Arish or Turkey, a leased pier at Ashdod or El-Arish, an artificial island — and none has been implemented. Meanwhile 5,000–8,000 truckloads a month enter Gaza from Israel at a high transport cost.
A Gaza port is, above all, a political question: Israeli security objections have blocked every alternative. Shaban concludes that reactivating the existing international agreements — with European funding already allocated, estimated in 2016 at $200–250 million — is the only realistic path, and that the port “should not wait for reconciliation. It should be an incentive for it.”
Recommendations
Reactivate the Oslo and Sharm el-Sheikh provisions on the Gaza seaport as the guarantor of its international operation, drawing on the European funding already allocated.
While the division lasts, adopt a temporary solution under UN and international auspices, with international organisations involved in managing and supervising the port as the EU mission once did at Rafah.
Treat maritime lines and leased piers only as temporary measures pending a port in Gaza; a pier at El-Arish requires regional consensus, a political solution and the approval of the Palestinian Authority.
Build security arrangements against smuggling into the port's design as a Palestinian interest, not only an Israeli demand.
Do not make the port wait for reconciliation: use it as an incentive for it.
Expected outcomes
Building and operating a seaport would create 50,000 jobs and trigger a leap in the Palestinian economy.
Lower import costs and new employment, reducing Gaza's very high unemployment.
Stronger economic ties between the northern and southern governorates, and Gaza as a stopover for ships between Asia and Europe.
A powerful incentive for reconciliation and “an important factor for stability, development, and peace in the region.”