عOmar Shaban IsmailPolitical Economy · Palestine

Policy idea

Governing Gaza's Day After

Omar Shaban's path for governing Gaza after the war: a temporary, independent technocratic administration that works with the civil servants who already run the Strip, a retrained police force, internationally monitored crossings, and a defined road to elections and Palestinian reunification.

Omar Shaban's path for post-war Gaza: an independent interim committee, the Strip's own civil servants, a retrained police and a road to elections.

Writing in 2024 and 2025, Shaban starts from hard assumptions: Israel will not accept a Hamas role in governing Gaza; Hamas did not bless the new Palestinian Authority government; and attempting to restore public safety or launch reconstruction without the de facto authority's remaining personnel would be “unrealistic and very risky”. He sees two phases: an interim of about two years under independent technocrats with international backing, then an elected government. Gaza has not voted since 2006, and 68% of its people are under 30.

No administration can restore order or launch reconstruction in Gaza without the civil servants of the de facto authority — by Shaban's estimate 20,000–25,000 people in health, education and infrastructure. They must be engaged, while Hamas members themselves would have no place in the future government or security force.

Recommendations

  • Appoint an interim committee of about fifteen independent, professional administrators with no political ties, screened and approved by Israel, the United States, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, for a transition of roughly two years.
  • Engage the civil servants of the de facto authority in civil administration and reconstruction, with re-training where needed, while excluding Hamas members from the future government and security force.
  • Build a domestic police force from Palestinian Authority security personnel in Gaza and residual police of the de facto authority, trained and supervised by senior police professionals from Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.
  • Have the EU and the United States, with the PA crossings department, monitor the entry of materials, and open Rafah permanently so that qualified Gazans who left can return.
  • Give the committee access to the financial support it needs, and earn the community's acceptance through tangible services: food, medical care and stability.
  • Convene multilateral dialogues of international, regional and local actors to identify shared priorities — stability, security, humanitarian relief — and a foundational agreement that includes diverse perspectives on Gaza's governance.
  • Set out a roadmap to end the Palestinian division, beginning with the promise of elections within a defined timespan, leading to an elected government.

Expected outcomes

  • Sufficient stability to rebuild the territory and prevent a relapse of fighting.
  • Former civil servants accepting the new order because they are included in it.
  • If two years of rebuilding bring people support and the hope of a new election, Gazans “will see they have more options than violence.”

Sources

Presented at

  • Middle East Institute webinar “What Is Needed to End the Gaza War?” — Washington, D.C. (16 July 2025) — 2025

Topic: Governance

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