Omar Shaban's proposal, first set out with Sultan Barakat in 2014 and revised in 2024, for a Gaza Reconstruction Council: a representative body that manages reconstruction and a ring-fenced trust fund, consults Gaza's own institutions, and accounts publicly for every pledge, so that reconstruction does not repeat the failures of 2009 and 2014.
Omar Shaban's proposal for a Gaza Reconstruction Council and a ring-fenced trust fund, so pledges reach Gaza and are publicly accounted for.
Shaban's diagnosis, drawn from the wars of 2008–09 and 2014, is a dilemma of legitimacy and control: the Palestinian Authority is the recognised authority, Hamas has governed Gaza since 2007, and Israel controls access. Donors feared their aid would reach Hamas; Gaza's institutions were excluded (no Gaza-based organisation attended the 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh conference, whose plan was presented only in English); and no comprehensive account of what became of the 2009 pledges exists. In 2024 he adapted the proposal to the post-October 2023 situation: a temporary council of 12–15 vetted Palestinian Authority employees living in Gaza, working with the de facto authority's civil servants, alongside a police force, internationally monitored crossings and a fund for civil society.
Gaza's reconstructions have stalled not for lack of pledges but for lack of an agreed way to manage them: by late December 2014, Palestinian Housing Ministry officials reported receiving about 2% of the $5.4 billion pledged in Cairo. Shaban's answer is a collaborative reconstruction council and a trust fund held outside the budgets of both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.
Recommendations
Establish a collaborative Gaza Reconstruction Council chaired by an independent figure trusted by all sides, with the Palestinian Authority, regional states, the EU, the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, non-affiliated civil society, the Palestinian factions and the UN agencies (UNRWA and UNDP).
Create a specialist trust fund at the Islamic Development Bank or the World Bank to receive all donations for Gaza's reconstruction, held in a separate account outside the Palestinian Authority and Hamas budgets and overseen by the council.
Keep reconstruction money in a dedicated fund that is never used to cover budget deficits, with receipts and disbursements accredited and monitored by an independent body.
Hold intensive, regular consultations with Gaza-based institutions — including the Hamas leadership, NGOs, business associations and universities — to assess damage, design interventions and implement them, and recruit local companies and institutions wherever possible.
Offer security guarantees through independent monitoring at crossing points rather than on construction sites, press Israel to end the blockade so that the raw materials needed can enter, and encourage Egypt to open its border as part of a wider recovery plan.
After the 2023–2025 war, form a temporary council of 12–15 vetted Palestinian Authority employees living in Gaza — including the heads of the water and energy authorities, the contractors' union, the businessmen's association, the police chief and two or three civil society members — that coordinates with the PA government, declares it has no political mandate, works with the de facto authority's civil servants, publishes its work on a website and hosts observer-liaisons from UNRWA, WFP, WHO, the ICRC and Palestinian NGOs.
Involve the Palestinian diaspora early, for its technical expertise and capital.
Expected outcomes
The benefits of reconstruction shared transparently and equitably among Gaza's population, based only on established needs, not on political allegiance.
Israel's fear that easing access would lead to rearmament laid aside by the council's monitoring of building-material imports.
Pledged resources kept committed to the Palestinian people regardless of the pace of progress.
Palestinian factions drawn, by working around the same table, into dialogue on substance — and, he hopes, a wider national dialogue.